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TRADEMARKS AND PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
David E. Adelman* & Graeme W. Austin**

This Article examines the relationship between private environmental governance and
trademark law. Over the past two decades, green trademarks and other forms of private governance have flourished in tandem with the retreat from national and international public law
modalities of environmental regulation. The rising political opposition to environmental regulation partly accounts for this change. Also relevant is the rise of globalization, which due to
jurisdictional and trade constraints has diminished the effective regulatory control countries have
over products sold in their markets.
Private environmental governance is premised on consumers “voting with their wallets” by
selecting products that reflect not just their instrumental preferences, but also their values. The
potential of this form of private governance has not been realized, however, in part because
consumers are often overwhelmed by information from multiple green trademarks with different
standards or criteria. The resulting congestion of market information has undermined the communicative function of green trademarks that is essential to enabling consumers to make environmentally responsible choices.
For a variety of reasons, trademark law is premised on a narrowly prescribed role for trademarks that is poorly adapted to facilitating information-based forms of private governance.
Instead, intramural battles over the scope of trademark rights—ignited by overreaching corporate
branding strategies—have elevated a reactionary turn in trademark theory that reduces trademarks solely to identifying the specific source of a product or service. We argue that the normative
ends of private environmental governance should factor into, though by no means determine,
trademark policy.
© 2017 David E. Adelman & Graeme W. Austin. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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Robert Burrell, Irene Calboli, Graeme Dinwoodie, Dev Gangjee, Emily Hudson, Jed
Kroncke, Annette Kur, Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng, Haochen Sun, David Tan and the
participants at seminars and public lectures at the Oxford University Intellectual Property
Research Centre, the Cambridge University Centre for Intellectual Property and
Information Law, the Sheffield University School of Law, Hong Kong University Law and
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INTRODUCTION
Can trademark law empower consumers to select products that reflect
not just their instrumental preferences but also their values? The answer
might seem obvious. Consumer markets are awash in product certifications
that, to name just a few, alert consumers to corporate labor standards, fair
trade policies, and environmental practices.1 In this Article, we focus on
“green trademarks”—or “ecolabels”—that convey information about the sustainability of production and manufacturing processes, the environmental
impacts of commercial operations, and the safety of materials in end-products.2 In part as a response to economic globalization,3 hundreds of ecolabels have been established and reputable programs have emerged over
time and succeeded commercially.4 Third-party environmental certification
is now a mainstream form of private governance and, by implication if not
always by design, trademarks are essential to its success.5
This Article examines the legal boundary issues impacting informationbased forms of private governance that incorporate elements of intellectual
property and environmental law.6 The principal source of tension we identify is the divergent motivations that animate the two legal domains. Environmental governance in the form of product certification fills information gaps
1 See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Unregulated Certification Mark(et), 69 STAN. L. REV. 121,
125–26 (2017). Examples include “Fair Trade,” Starbucks’s “C.A.F.E. Practices,” and “FSC
Forest Management.” See Doug Miller & Peter Williams, What Price a Living Wage?: Implementation Issues in the Quest for Decent Wages in the Global Apparel Sector, 9 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y
99, 109 (2009); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 149, 151 n.100 (2013).
2 See What Is Ecolabelling?, GLOB. ECOLABELLING NETWORK (2017), https://
www.globalecolabelling.net/what-is-eco-labelling; see also Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311, 2311 & n.3 (2009); Maureen Beacom Gorman, What Does It
Mean to Be Green: A Short Analysis of Emerging IP Issues in “Green” Marketing, 9 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 774, 774–75 (2010). We use the terms “green trademarks” and “ecolabels” interchangeably.
3 See Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 138.
4 See MIKE BARRY ET AL., TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF
CERTIFICATION ES-4, 9 (2012), http://www.resolv.org/site-assessment/towardsustainability/
.
5 The number of green trademarks is large and has increased rapidly. See Green Is the
New Black, ADWEEK (June 24, 2009), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/
green-new-black-105996. In 2007, the U.S Patent and Trademark Office received more
than 300,000 applications for green trademarks for brand names, logos, and taglines. See
JACQUELYN A. OTTMAN, THE NEW RULES OF GREEN MARKETING: STRATEGIES, TOOLS, AND
INSPIRATION FOR SUSTAINABLE BRANDING 12 (2011).
6 Similar kinds of boundary issues arise at the intersection of innovation and environmental policy. See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Richard G. Newell, Environmental and Technology
Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 142 (2008); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A
Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164
(2005); Richard G. Newell et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941 (1999).
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related to public goods and common pool resources.7 Most certification programs are established by private entities, both nonprofit and commercial, to
provide information that enables consumers to select products that reflect
their environmental values; in doing so, they create market incentives for
businesses to meet heightened standards by facilitating product differentiation and premium pricing.8 Trademarks, by contrast, safeguard market competition by preventing free riding and reducing consumer search costs.9 The
narrow focus reflected in these ends has been reinforced by widespread concerns about corporate branding strategies that threaten markets and free
speech.10 This experience has fostered an orthodoxy among academics and
other commentators that strictly limits trademarks to “signaling” the origin of
a product or service;11 all other communicative functions are considered suspect—including those that facilitate product differentiation.12
We argue that the prevailing cabined view of trademarks is ill-adapted to
the growing importance of private governance in a globalized world where
markets, politics, and social policy are intertwined.13 Understood broadly,
private governance involves consumers “voting with their wallets,” that is,
making market decisions that are not limited to satisfying purely self-interest7
Public
8
9

See Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 174; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
See Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 176, 180, 184.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 170 (2003); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007).
10 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778–80 (2004); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1731 (1999) (“Competition is, after
all, the premise of the system.”).
11 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[A
trademark] ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’
for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked
(or disliked) in the past.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2] (3d ed.
1994))).
12 See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that “a trademark
is . . . a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods”);
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 817
(1927) (highlighting the very limited nature of the information communicated by a trademark: “while the consumer [need] not know the specific source of a trademarked article,
he nevertheless knows that two articles, bearing the same mark, emanate from a single
source”).
13 See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION
IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003); see also Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 907–12 (2004); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 527
(2004) (concluding that “[f]or better or worse, then, the market and the consumer are
central to public policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century”).
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driven preferences.14 The noninstrumental nature of these interests implicates intangible characteristics, as opposed to directly discernible product
qualities, that knowledge of a product’s source alone typically does not
address.15 Recognizing these limitations, the Lanham Act contains a separate class of marks, “certification marks,”16 that are specifically designed to
communicate complex or less readily discernible product information.17
Unlike conventional trademarks, certification marks are not used in commerce by the owner of a mark; nor do they signal a unique commercial
source.18 Instead, licenses to use certification marks may be issued to any
company that meets the standards of a certifying entity.19
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the availability of certification marks resolves the shortcomings of trademark policy. First, the formal
legal distinctions between certification marks and conventional trademarks
are often meaningless for consumers; they view ecolabels of either variety as
operating the same way in shared commercial spaces.20 This functional overlap effectively erases any boundary between certification marks and conventional trademarks. In the case of sustainably grown coffee, for example,
numerous third-party certification organizations exist, but many companies—including market leaders such as Starbucks21—use conventional trademarks as ecolabels to convey information about their sustainable practices.22
Similar to certification marks, the use of private ecolabels is motivated by an
amalgam of normative environmental commitments and marketing objectives that reflect consumer preferences.23
14 Noa Tal, Aesthetic Functionality: Trademark Law’s Red Herring Doctrine, 22 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 25, 29 (2013).
15 Id. at 62.
16 Certification marks are registrable under 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012). See discussion in
Section II.A infra.
17 See Chon, supra note 2, at 2312; Fromer, supra note 1, at 127–28; see also Daphne
Zografos Johnsson, Signs Beyond Borders: Moving from Commodity to Differentiated Exports in the
Coffee Industry, in TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 125 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014).
18 See Fromer, supra note 1, at 129.
19 Owners of certification marks cannot refuse to allow entities that comply with the
certification standards to use the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D). For a detailed discussion of certification marks, see 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:90 (4th ed. 2008).
20 Juliane Reinecke et al., The Emergence of a Standards Market: Multiplicity of Sustainability Standards in the Global Coffee Industry, 33 ORG. STUD. 791, 792 (2012) (describing
how “multiple overlapping standards, developed by both social movement organizations
and firms, co-exist and compete for adopters in the same sector”).
21 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 41 (discussing the elements of Starbucks’s C.A.F.E.
Practices program).
22 See infra subsection I.B.2.
23 GLOBAL ECOLABELLING NETWORK, INTRODUCTION TO ECOLABELLING 4–5 (2004),
https://www.globalecolabelling.net/assets/Uploads/intro-to-ecolabelling.pdf.
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Second, the efficacy of ecolabels is vulnerable to consumer information
overload,24 which the proliferation of private ecolabels has greatly exacerbated.25 The information conveyed by ecolabels is particularly vulnerable to
this type of marketplace congestion because ecolabels correct information
asymmetries related to a good’s origin or manufacture that are not directly
evident to consumers.26 With these kinds of “credence” goods,27 information asymmetries must be corrected before trademarks can enable consumers
to trace products with environmental characteristics they like (or wish to
avoid) back to a specific company.28 The technical nature of this information increases the risk of information overload: the more ecolabels there are,
the more information there is to process, and the more likely consumers will
be to use shortcuts (that savvy marketing can exploit) or to give up entirely.29
In addition, competition between third-party certification and private ecolabels (covered by conventional trademarks) can undermine environmental
standards by propelling a “race to the bottom” in which certification organizations relax their standards to retain commercial users.30
24 See Dorothée Brécard, Consumer Confusion over the Profusion of Eco-Labels: Lessons from
a Double Differentiation Model, 37 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 64, 65–66 (2014) (observing
that “when consumers are given the choice between several labels, some of them turn away
from the eco-labeled product”); Rick Harbaugh et al., Label Confusion: The Groucho Effect of
Uncertain Standards, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1512, 1513 (2011) (finding empirically that “[a]s the
number of different standards rises . . . the informativeness of labeling goes to zero”).
25 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 94 (describing how “the number of competing programs has increased at such a rapid pace that there is confusion in the marketplace”).
26 Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon Labeling in a
Green Economy, 34 ENERGY ECON. S53, S54 (2012) (describing such products as “credence
goods” because consumers cannot discern “their potential harm to the consumer’s (or
public’s) health—either at the point of purchase or through casual experience”); Jamie A.
Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG.
147, 150 (1993) ( “Green marketing is more problematic than . . . other forms of advertising because consumers generally cannot substantiate environmental claims on their own.
Although people can compare the taste of Coke and Pepsi, and observe their laundry after
washing with Tide or Cheer, they generally cannot verify recycled content claims or statements about the ozone layer.”).
27 Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 26, at S54.
28 Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants, 97 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 239, 240 (2014) (observing that “[w]hile brand names facilitate reputation, and thus
represent a good mechanism for improving information in the cases of search or experience attributes, their self-labeling nature does not allow them to deal with information
problems related to credence attributes”).
29 See Harbaugh et al., supra note 24, at 1513.
30 Luc Fransen & Thomas Conzelmann, Fragmented or Cohesive Transnational Private
Regulation of Sustainability Standards? A Comparative Study, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 259, 260
(2015) (observing that “[w]ith businesses being able to choose between regulators, there
might be a gravitational effect to the most lenient standards”); see Harbaugh et al., supra
note 24, at 1512 (highlighting how “confusion by consumers is widely blamed for undermining the credibility of ecolabels, thereby reducing the incentive for firms to adopt
them”).
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It is not necessary to adopt a particular stance on the relative merits of
private governance and legal centralism31 to recognize the virtues of private
governance given contemporary politics. The intensifying ideological opposition to national environmental regulations and multilateral treaties has elevated the importance of private governance.32 Almost daily, the prospects of
government responses to pressing environmental and other global problems
appear more remote.33 In this context, private market-oriented interventions are among the few remaining viable responses to national and global
environmental issues.
The political currents today also reflect, and in part are a response to,
the rapid globalization that occurred following the end of the Cold War.
The resulting expansion in trade was instrumental in stimulating interest in
private environmental governance.34 In the United States, widespread movement of manufacturing offshore drastically limited the government’s capacity
to regulate the exploitation of natural resources and production processes
associated with goods entering its markets.35 Free trade policies reinforced
this loss of national control because they were premised on like goods being
treated equivalently irrespective of their origin or how they were made.36 As
a result, commodities and manufacturing that were once largely domestic,
and thus under the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators, were increasingly
31

Cf. EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC
SOCIAL LIFE (2015).
32 See generally Matthew A. Cahn et al., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Environmental Policy in
the American West, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE WEST 36–38 (Zachary A.
Smith & John C. Freemuth eds., rev. ed. 2007).
33 See, e.g., Ben Adler, 11 Things the Republican Party Just Promised to Do to the Environment, MOTHER JONES (July 19, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/
07/republican-platform-environment-cleveland/; Coral Davenport, Scott Pruitt, Testifying to
Lead E.P.A., Criticizes Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/politics/scott-pruitt-testifying-to-lead-epa-criticizesenvironmental-rules.html; Henry Fountain & Erica Goode, Trump Has Options for Undoing
Obama’s Climate Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
25/science/donald-trump-obama-climate.html; Amber Phillips, Congress’s Long History of
Doing Nothing on Climate Change, in 6 Acts, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/01/congresss-long-history-of-inaction-on-climate-change-in-6-parts/?utm_term=.1114e1a64467.
34 See SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, TAKING TRADE TO THE STREETS: THE LOST HISTORY OF
PUBLIC EFFORTS TO SHAPE GLOBALIZATION 101–06 (2001); BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES13; MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA (1999); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization:
The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J.
SOC. 297, 308 (2007).
35 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 19–20; I.M. Destler, America’s Uneasy History with
Free Trade, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/americas-uneasy-his
tory-with-free-trade.
36 See Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts:
The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 411–12 (2014).
AND
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extracted or manufactured in countries with lax or nonexistent standards.37
The impacts of this shift were hotly contested when the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
were established in the mid-1990s.38 It was this experience along with faltering negotiations on multilateral environmental treaties that first prompted
environmental activists to gravitate towards private governance.39
The ultimate success of these market-oriented initiatives depends on
consumers being able to identify goods and services that reflect their environmental values. Trademarks are universally recognized as the principal
tool consumers use to select commercial products.40 And yet, because orthodox trademark theory restricts trademarks to ensuring that consumers can
efficiently identify the source of a good or service,41 measures that could
enable consumers to select products based on their environmental preferences are significantly compromised. This Article undertakes a critical examination of trademark law and the opportunities for reforming it to
encompass environmental values and preferences that are not purely
instrumental.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the normative justifications for and emergence of ecolabels in the 1990s and then turns to two case
studies—forestry and coffee—that illustrate how ecolabels operate in different market sectors. Part II describes the prevailing theory of trademarks,
examines the existing caselaw relevant to green trademarks, and analyzes the
shortcomings of trademark law with respect to ecolabels and private governance generally. Finally, Part III discusses the normative and practical implications of private environmental governance for trademark law and related
federal policies. Several options for amending the Lanham Act are explored,
ranging from categorical prohibitions on granting conventional trademarks
to refinements of the legal doctrines for obtaining a trademark.
37 See Sikina Jinnah & Julia Kennedy, A New Era of Trade-Environment Politics: Learning
from US Leadership and Its Consequences Abroad, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 95,
95–97, 100 (2011) (describing the limited consideration of environmental issues in U.S.
trade agreements).
38 See JOHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 2–3 (Barry Rabe & John Tierney eds., 1997); David E. Sanger,
Ideas & Trends; Trade War on the Home Front, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1997), http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/09/14/weekinreview/ideas-trends-trade-war-on-the-homefront.html; Anne Swardson, Trade Body Summit Targeted for Protests, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
1999, at A1.
39 GRAEME AULD, CONSTRUCTING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: THE RISE AND EVOLUTION OF
FOREST, COFFEE, AND FISHERIES CERTIFICATION 71–72 (2014); Bartley, supra note 34, at 305
40 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at 167.
41 The few examples of alternative perspectives are discussed in Graeme B. Dinwoodie
& Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597,
1599–1600 (2007); Megan Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 193
(2004); Haochen Sun, The Diversity of Interests in the Trademark Protection of Luxury Brands, in
DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 426 (Irene
Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015).
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PRODUCT CERTIFICATION

Green trademarks were not used widely in the United States until the
1980s,42 when consumer interest arose broadly around organic food and sustainable products.43 Foreshadowing the persistent problems with information overload, the initial wave of ecolabels was dominated by companyspecific labels with vague claims about products being “eco-friendly,”
“biodegradable,” or “recyclable” that lacked rigorous or consistent standards.44 Interest in ecolabels at this time was driven by business marketing
that left many consumers confused and skeptical about the claims being
made.45 The proliferation of misleading labels ultimately prompted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to issue guidance on standards for green
trademarks in 1992, which greatly reduced the number of misleading labels
and facilitated the emergence of reliable third-party certification programs.46
By the early 1990s, several leading government-sponsored certification
marks were established.47 These certification regimes became model programs, with the German “Blue Angel” ecolabel, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) “Energy Star” program, and the European Union’s
“Ecolabel” being among the most influential globally.48 In the United States,
this success was facilitated by legal mandates, knowledge drawn from adjunct
federal programs, and the perceived objectivity and credibility of federal
agencies.49 These advantages caused federal programs to crowd out private
ones, but they also place significant limits on the number and types of programs.50 For political, economic, and legal reasons, government labeling
programs focus on end-product characteristics, such as energy efficiency, that
require expertise and specialized equipment to assess, but little or no information on source materials or production methods. With the exception of a
few programs tied to existing national regulatory programs (e.g., food and
agricultural inspection), government labeling programs do not cover envi42 A few precursors date back to the 1960s, such as the label for organic coffee established by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements in 1967. AULD,
supra note 39, at 7 tbl.1.1.
43 Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-Labeling for Energy Efficiency and Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of US Programs, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 109, 109 (2003).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. Canada and the United Kingdom promulgated regulations similar to those of
the FTC around the same time, and a number of other countries rely on business guidance
developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to mitigate the use
of misleading labels (Australia, France, Norway). See Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel
Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 64, 70 (2011).
47 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 19–20.
48 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 29, 77; see also EUROPEAN ENVTL. BUREAU, THE EU
ECOLABEL FACTSHEET (May 2017), http://eeb.org/work-areas/resource-efficiency/eu-ecolabel/.
49 Banerjee & Solomon, supra note 43, at 120.
50 Id. at 119–20.
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ronmental conditions in other countries.51 Beyond funding constraints,
opposition from foreign governments on sovereignty grounds, restrictions
imposed by trade regimes, and diplomatic considerations limit governmentsponsored certification.52 Federal programs such as Energy Star and
Organic Certification have provided important models, but the number and
types of such programs are strictly bounded.53
Independent third-party certification programs constituted a third wave
of ecolabels that emerged in the mid-1990s as a response to the declining
reach of national laws and faltering international negotiations.54 Growth in
international trade, which roughly doubled during the 1990s, occurred in
conjunction with technological advances that fueled the move towards
globalization.55 These changes highlighted jurisdictional limits on regulating international trade that were compounded by liberal free trade regimes,
which imposed new legal restraints on the conditions countries could place
on goods entering their markets.56 They also exposed tensions between the
economic benefits of opening global markets, which advocates claimed
would promote international development, and national environmental and
labor policies.57 During this period, trade and environmental disputes permeated public debate over globalization, and despite promising examples of
compromise,58 most environmentalists became disillusioned with countervailing efforts to promote progressive international governance by the early
1990s.59
Negotiations on international environmental treaties, most notably at
the 1992 U.N. Earth Summit in Rio, fell far short of expectations in the midst
of this global economic transformation.60 Initially animated by the optimism
following the end of the Cold War, negotiations leading up to the Earth Summit were plagued by conflicts over national sovereignty and the right to
develop.61 As a consequence, far from signaling a new world order of inter51 The “organic food” standard is the only such standard that has been codified into
law in many countries. See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 809.
52 See Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 138.
53 Banerjee & Solomon, supra note 43, at 120 (describing consumer preference for
“seals of approval,” such as the EPA “Energy Star” seal, over “information labels,” such as
the Department of Energy’s “Energy Guide” label).
54 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES-4; Bartley, supra note 34, at 298, 301.
55 BROCK R. WILLIAMS & J. MICHAEL DONNELLY, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TRENDS
AND FORECASTS 8 fig.4 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33577.pdf (imports
more than doubled and exports came close to doubling from 1991 to 2000).
56 Sanger, supra note 38; Swardson, supra note 38, at A1.
57 Sanger, supra note 38.
58 The most notable examples of this are the environmental and labor side agreements under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Sanger, supra note 38. However, even they were—and are—far from universally viewed as being adequately protective
of these interests. See, e.g., Bartley, supra note 34, at 331.
59 AULD, supra note 39, at 71–72; Bartley, supra note 34, at 317.
60 Bartley, supra note 34, at 320.
61 AUDLEY, supra note 38, at 2–3; Bartley, supra note 34, at 317; Sanger, supra note 38;
Swardson, supra note 38, at A1. Negotiations over sustainable forestry practices were a
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national cooperation, the Earth Summit exposed the persistence of longstanding political and economic barriers to international environmental
governance.62 Trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in 1994 and 1996 to 1997, and later the WTO regime,
followed a similar pattern and ultimately failed to incorporate provisions on
either labor or environmental standards that civil society groups viewed as
adequate.63 This was especially dispiriting in light of the political salience of
the issues at the time and the intensity of activism around the WTO regime.64
The barriers to international governance and inexorable rise of international trade prompted a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and foundations, later assisted by national governments, to take action.65
Recognizing the practical constraints on public law,66 they explored models
for “private governance” that avoided reliance on either national governments or multilateral treaties. Private third-party certification regimes
quickly became an attractive model because they were immune to the growing opposition to national regulation within the United States and they circumvented potential trade challenges, which could only be brought against
government regulations.67
Prior experience with successful divestment campaigns and consumer
boycotts in the 1980s was also central to this realignment because it demonstrated that businesses were sensitive to market-oriented political activism.68
Foremost among these campaigns were the boycotts of tropical timber in the
late 1980s that were associated with large-scale threats to rainforests, as well as
particular flashpoint in significant part because eighty percent of forests globally are publicly owned. See Marie-France Turcotte et al., Explaining Variation in the Multiplicity of Private Social and Environmental Regulation: A Multi-Case Integration Across the Coffee, Forestry and
Textile Sectors, 16 BUS. & POL. 151, 152, 164 (2014).
62 Bartley, supra note 34, at 320 (describing the circumstances that led environmentalists to “interpret[ ] Rio . . . as additional evidence that private initiatives were the place to
focus their energies”); Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Non-State Global Governance:
Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?, in HARD CHOICES,
SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 33, 33–34 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
63 Bartley, supra note 34, at 332–33.
64 Id.; see also AUDLEY, supra note 38, at 2–3.
65 AULD, supra note 39, at 75 (describing how NGO efforts to pressure national governments and intergovernmental entities to take protective action on forestry issues grew in
the 1980s but were unheeded and led to searches for alternatives to government regulation). By 1990, NGOs had lost faith in the intergovernmental entities, including the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), after years of urging them to take action. Id. at 75.
66 Benjamin W. Cashore et al., Legitimizing Political Consumerism: The Case of Forest
Certi?cation in North America and Europe, in POLITICS, PRODUCTS, AND MARKETS: EXPLORING
POLITICAL CONSUMERISM PAST AND PRESENT 182 (Michele Micheletti et al. eds., 2004); Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 794.
67 Bartley, supra note 34, at 315, 320–22, 332–33; Wu & Salzman, supra note 36, at
411–12.
68 AULD, supra note 39, at 69.
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“naming and shaming” campaigns that exposed the lack of control major
wood products companies had over their supply chains.69 These campaigns
provided a direct proof of principle in the early 1990s when large home
improvement retailers in the European Union and United States agreed to
stock wood products certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).70
This success galvanized support for private third-party certification, and led
to the establishment of several prominent global certification programs—in
addition to FSC, the Marine Stewardship Council, the Rainforest Alliance/
Sustainable Agriculture Network, and Social Accountability International.71
The use of green trademarks continues to expand today because of consumer demand, the reputational and market-entry benefits they provide for
businesses, and their unique capacity to fill significant gaps in national and
international environmental regulations.72 Globally, green trademarks are
now found in 199 countries and exist for 465 product categories spanning
twenty-five industrial sectors.73 Their influence is reflected in the market
penetration of certified products and proliferation of ecolabels among leading businesses. For example, approximately seven percent of global oceancapture fisheries were certified in 2011, but the global average masks much
higher regional levels—about sixty percent of fisheries production was certified in the United States.74 Similarly, certification in the forestry sector,
which has two of the oldest certification programs, covers about thirty-three
percent of the forests currently in production.75
69 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 30; Bartley, supra note 34, at 317, 320–21 (during the
early 1990s, bans on tropical timber were passed in 100 European cities, several European
countries, and a few U.S. cities). Governments were critically important in the establishment of certification programs in the early 1990s. The Austrian government enacted a ban
on imports of tropical timber not sustainably managed, which led to a threatened unfair
trade practice challenge under the GATT. While the Austrian government rescinded the
law in response, it used the money earmarked for implementing it to support establishment of the FSC. Id.
70 AULD, supra note 39, at 82; Bartley, supra note 34, at 323–34.
71 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES-4, 7; Bartley, supra note 34, at 326–27, 326 fig.3
(observing that exposés of poor labor practices in the mid-1990s similarly prompted
apparel companies to support certification regimes for labor standards as a means of protecting their brands).
72 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-126. Moreover, this rapid growth is expected to
continue due to rising consumer demand and commitments of leading companies to
source products or materials from certified suppliers. Id. (describing recent commitments
by companies such as Unilever, Kraft, Nestle, Dole, Chiquita, and Mars to purchase certified agricultural products, including tea, coffee, bananas, and cocoa).
73 ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com.
74 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-75. Similar levels of market penetration, often
driven by the largest producers, have been achieved for bananas (twenty percent of global
exports), coffee (seventeen percent), and tea (about eight percent but growing rapidly).
Id. at A-126 to A-127. Interestingly, similar to seafood, only eight percent of certified coffee is labeled as such. Id.
75 AULD, supra note 39, at 107–08 (two certification regimes, the NGO-led Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the industry-led PEFC cover most of the forests certified).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL206.txt

720

unknown

Seq: 12

notre dame law review

28-DEC-17

10:24

[vol. 93:2

Corporate advertising about “green” policies and trademarks has also
grown dramatically over the last twenty-five years, increasing by a factor of ten
between 1990 and 2011 and accelerating further over the last five years when
it tripled in volume.76 This growth has exacerbated problems with consumer
information overload in many markets—particularly agricultural commodities such as coffee and tea.77 The proliferation of advertising is compounded
by the continued prevalence of “greenwashing,” which in essence involves
unsubstantiated or vague and unverifiable claims about the environmental
characteristics of a product.78 In a recent survey, ninety-five percent of
reviewed product advertising engaged in at least one form of greenwashing,
which, while not necessarily tied to green trademarks, exacerbates the information overload experienced by consumers.79 Business executives themselves are troubled by these developments, as reflected in another recent
survey on green trademarks in which business leaders singled out as a chief
concern consumer misunderstanding spurred by the proliferation of ecolabels and the failure to harmonize standards.80 At the same time, business
leaders expressed deep frustration with what they viewed as the cost and complexity of third-party certification regimes, and their growing reluctance to
utilize them.81
The Sections that follow assess the theoretical grounding for certification programs and then discuss two case studies—coffee and fisheries—that
represent limiting cases for how certification regimes operate in practice.
Certified coffee is exemplary of certification marks that are consumer-oriented and used for marketing, whereas forest certification is exemplary of
certification providing a reputational shield for businesses.
A.

Ecolabels and Market Failures

Ecolabels correct two types of market failures: (1) information asymmetries associated with the environmental attributes of marketed goods or services; and (2) collective action problems driven by competing firms free
riding on (or tarnishing) the reputation of companies with superior environ76 Delmas & Burbano, supra note 46, at 64. This trend is also reflected in online corporate communication strategies; seventy-five percent of S&P companies in 2011 had websites on environmental performance and social policies at both the company and product
levels. Id. at 66.
77 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 94 (describing how “the number of competing programs has increased at such a rapid pace that there is confusion in the marketplace”).
78 See Delmas & Burbano, supra note 46, at 64.
79 Id.; Ans Kolk, Mainstreaming Sustainable Coffee, 21 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 324, 335 (2013)
(observing that while third-party certification has increased credibility for consumers,
“there can easily be too much information, more than consumers can digest due to
bounded rationality”).
80 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 91.
81 Id. at 47 fig.2.3 (in a recent survey of business officials, 47% expressed frustration
with the cost and complexity of certification regimes, 46% with the complex landscape of
ecolabels (i.e., too many labels, too much overlap between them, evidence of consumer
confusion), and 42% with the lack of effectiveness with consumers).
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mental practices.82 Information asymmetries are most commonly related to
the lifecycle costs of a product or service, such as energy efficiency, natural
resource consumption, or environmental externalities.83 This information is
distinct from the consumer confusion that is the object of trademark policy;
namely, confusion about the specific source of a product or service.84 Ecolabels instead operate as symbols, which may include simple scales or visual
metrics, for environmental attributes that are either intangible to consumers
or difficult for them to evaluate.85 Functionally, ecolabels operate in two
modes. In the first, consumers are the principal target of ecolabels, and the
expectation is that consumers will “vote with their wallets” by selecting products with superior environmental profiles.86 In the second, ecolabels prevent
free riding in industries with significant reputational spillovers across companies by enabling firms to distinguish themselves from competitors with poor
environmental records.87 Ecolabels therefore both support consumer choice
and protect businesses concerned about their brand and environmental
reputation.
The communicative function of ecolabels will vary in the specificity and
nature of the information that they convey. Many ecolabels operate, in
effect, as a “good seal of approval” from the certifying organization (e.g.,
“Fairtrade,” “Green Seal,” “FSC Forest Management,” “eco-certified Sustainable Travel”); in essence, they provide an overarching judgment of the sustainability of a product or the environmental practices of a company.
Complex, multifactor assessments may underlie a grant of certification, but
82 Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Collective Action Through Voluntary Environmental
Programs: A Club Theory Perspective, 35 POL’Y STUD. J. 773, 777–78 (2007) (describing the
information asymmetries corrected and the reputational benefits of voluntary private
forms of governance).
83 Many ecolabels focus on the characteristics of end products, such as energy efficiency, recycled content, capacity to be recycled or composted, biodegradability, or chemical makeup (toxicity, environmental persistence).
84 Cf. Austin, supra note 13 (scrutinizing assumptions as to consumers’ ability to distinguish between similarly branded products or services).
85 Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 26, at S54 (describing such characteristics as
“credence goods—the ingredients of a product and their potential harm to the consumer’s
(or public’s) health,” which consumers do not necessarily observe “either at the point of
purchase or through casual experience”); Grodsky, supra note 26, at 150.
86 Understood broadly, certification standards address a collective action problem that
implicates corporate reputation, information, and competition. As one group of commentators has explained:
Standards offer[ ] three solutions to this problem: they protect the reputations of
firms in the industry from free-riders, especially if firm reputations depend on the
reputation of the industry; they generate credible information about conditions
in the extended supply chain, especially if the supply chains of firms are highly
interconnected; and they help firms to maintain their competitive positions by
preventing the undercutting of costs and by justifying price differentials in the
marketplace, especially when meeting consumer concerns is costly.
Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 155.
87 Prakash & Potoski, supra note 82, at 778.
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the certification mark itself signals only that the criteria of a global assessment have been met. Other ecolabels attempt to convey a more precise measure of a company’s performance using either global metrics (e.g., high,
medium, low assessments) or more precise ones that reflect a particular
dimension of environmental sustainability (e.g., “Energy Star,” “CarbonFree,” “Global Recycle Standard,” “LEED Green Building Rating Systems,”
“Green-e Energy,” “Non-GMO”). The efficacy of either type of label can be
undermined when multiple overlapping ecolabels make it difficult for consumers to assess their meaning. Put differently, because few consumers
examine the details of certification programs, they must rely on the reputation of the certifying entity—which may be an independent third-party
organization, an industry-sponsored group, or an individual company—and
what they can glean from the certification mark about its meaning.88 In markets with a few high-profile ecolabels, the reputation of the certification programs will be more visible to consumers and the potential for information
overload minimal, both because the nature and reliability of the ecolabels
are clearer, given their prominence, and because consumers will not be confronted with competing claims, criteria, and types of ecolabels (i.e., private
versus third-party) that are difficult for them to parse. These considerations
imply that capacity of ecolabels to convey information is vulnerable to congestion—their efficacy declines as the number of ecolabels in a market
increases.
More formally, ecolabels operate as a type of private governance insofar
as they target public goods,89 common pool resources, and externalities
largely without the coercive authority of government.90 In classical economic
terms, the environmental reputations of firms in an industrial sector are
linked to the sector’s collective reputation, which is “held in common with
other firms.”91 A certification regime protects against reputational spillovers
by operating as a “club” that makes investments in superior environmental
measures excludable and thus fully or largely internalized.92 The “club
88 See Fromer, supra note 1, at 126.
89 Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 170, 182.
90 Id. at 138, 176, 180, 182 (noting, though, that government policies may facilitate or
support private third-party certification programs). For certification trademarks, there are
no government-mandated criteria for assessment of standards used by certification entities.
See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 19:91. The Federal Trade Commission has confirmed
that scrutiny of these standards will be on a case-by-case basis. 49 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) 487 (Sept. 19, 1985).
91 Prakash & Potoski, supra note 82, at 787 (“Actions of one firm in an industry have
positive or negative consequences for the other industry firms, which is what we mean
when we say that the industry reputation is ‘held in common’ by firms. Environmental
mishaps by one firm impose negative reputational externalities on other firms in the industry, thereby diminishing the industry’s reputation.”).
92 See Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67, 81 (2011) (observing that companies
use private governance measures such as certification as protection against “‘name and
shame’ campaigns, and generally to restore the firm’s social license to operate”); see also
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good” (i.e., an excludable but nonrival resource) provided by certification is
the enhanced reputation of the participating firms,93 which are shielded
against poor business practices of uncertified competitors.94 For example,
destructive logging practices in tropical rainforests pose a reputational threat
to businesses that purchase lumber or sell wood products—unless a business
can credibly demonstrate that the wood they use comes from sustainably
managed forests. Certification programs provide an independent—and thus
credible to activists and consumers—means of distinguishing a business from
its peers by corroborating the soundness of its environmental practices.95
A secondary benefit of certification programs is that they pool resources
and spread administrative costs.96 Certification programs confront many difficult technical challenges associated with collecting and evaluating environmental information. In the fisheries context, for example, management
practices are still evolving and must contend with gaps in understanding, limited data, and the inherent complexity of ocean ecosystems.97 Determining
reliable metrics and setting protective standards involves an enormous
amount of work, including extensive administrative procedures and interactions with stakeholders. In this respect, certification programs have much in
common with government regulations. Ideally, they satisfy high scientific
standards and follow administrative processes to maximize transparency,
ensure the fairness of their deliberative procedures, and maintain the legitimacy of their standards.98
Certification programs must therefore strike a balance between being
responsive to key stakeholders and maintaining their independence.99 For
AULD, supra note 39, at 14 (“[C]ertification programs produce excludable and nonrival
benefits for their members (a positive environmental reputation) with the ancillary advantage that a club’s standard, which members must meet to be in the club, generates public
good benefits for society at large. . . . [T]he key benefit is a shared reputational benefit,
which grows—via network effects—with increased participation.” (citation omitted)).
93 Prakash & Potoski, supra note 82, at 776.
94 Bartley, supra note 34, at 307–08.
95 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 40; Bartley, supra note 34, at 307 (describing certification as “an institutional design that can overcome these problems, because it creates a
‘club good’ to subdivide the industry reputation—that is, to distinguish the good apples
from the bad”).
96 Potoski & Prakash, supra note 82, at 236–37.
97 AULD, supra note 39, at 238; see also BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-77 to -79
(describing the difficulties of measuring impacts of obtaining reliable data).
98 The core institutional elements of a certification program are (1) the inspection
and monitoring regimes for companies with certified products; and (2) the governance
structures and procedures for setting and implementing the certification standards themselves. AULD, supra note 39, at 4. Others have identified a similar set of elements that
further reinforce the importance of transparency, procedures, and verification. The elements are: (1) transparency, (2) clarity of standards, (3) reliable means for verification, (4)
stakeholder engagement, (5) competency and accessibility, and (6) progressive learning
and enhancement of certification regimes. See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES-15.
99 Prakash & Potoski, supra note 82, at 788 (“Designing voluntary clubs requires balancing competing imperatives. On the one hand, to enhance the club’s credibility with
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consumers, the credibility of certification programs will turn on perceptions
about the balance and rigor of the programs’ procedures, as much as or
more than on specific technical issues. The importance of public perceptions is reflected in the programs’ layers of technical review and institutional
checks on standard setting and implementation.100 For stakeholders, administrative procedures must include processes for input and compromise, even
if technical experts have the final say on the form these procedures take.101
Stakeholders should also have an interest in open and balanced processes, as
they are similarly reliant on a certification entity’s credibility. Finally, given
the technical complexity of most environmental issues, the principal information that a certification mark conveys will often be institutional—the
marks reflect each organization’s reputation for rigorous standards and reliably ensuring that those standards are met.102
These organizational checks and balances are particularly important
because federal regulatory oversight of certification programs associated with
registered certification marks is thin.103 In theory, a certification mark may
be canceled if the owner does not control the use of the mark.104 In practice, however, certification marks are seldom expunged.105 Having jetexternal stakeholders, sponsors may prefer stringent standards. On the other hand, such
standards may lead to low membership—and smaller network effects and scale economies
in building the voluntary club brand—as few firms are able to meet demanding membership requirements.”).
100 Once established, accreditation and auditing requirements govern enforcement of
the standards and operation of the certifying organization. In most cases, an independent
accreditation entity will monitor and review the competence of the certification organization itself, while independent auditors will review and verify the compliance of companies
with certification standards. See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 10.
101 Id. In most cases, a technical advisory body develops auditable criteria based on
technical information and stakeholder input. Id.
102 Id. at 12, 51, 101.
103 See Fromer, supra note 1, 123–24; Chon, supra note 2, at, 2334–38.
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1881, 1886 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“The purpose of requiring control over use of a certification mark, as with a trademark, is two-fold: to protect the value of the mark and its
significance as an indication of source, and to prevent the public from being misled or
deceived as to the source of the product or its genuineness.” (citing Midwest Plastic
Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 906 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).
105 Chon, supra note 2, at 2337. According to the leading case in the area, Midwest
Plastic Fabricators, Inc., control is tested according to a “standard of reasonableness”: the
control required to prevent the public from being misled requires only “such control as is
practicable under all the circumstances of the case.” 906 F.2d at 1573; see also Swiss Watch
Int’l, Inc. v. Fed’n of Swiss Watch Indus., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1731, 1740 (T.T.A.B.
2012) (“The question is whether the control is adequate.”). Recently, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office tightened the standards for certification marks in a number of respects.
Owners of certification marks are required to disclose whether their standards for certification have changed and to submit a copy of any revised certification standards. Changes in
Requirements for Collective Trademarks and Service Marks, Collective Membership Marks,
and Certification Marks, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,170, 33,182–83 (June 11, 2015) (codified at 37
C.F.R. pts. 2 and 7) (changes in 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.161(j)(ii), 7.37(j)).
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tisoned earlier attempts to establish a more formalized system of oversight,
the FTC now supervises certification systems on an ad hoc basis.106 Moreover, for a registered certification mark, the law does not require the public to
understand or even know about the certification process that stands behind
it.107 This minimalist legal rule has reinforced the federal government’s reticence to regulate certification marks closely.
The discussion in the Sections below highlights the distinctive virtues of
certification programs, particularly their capacity to fill gaps in national and
international regulatory regimes, and the different roles green trademarks
and certification programs play. We find that the conventional model of
green trademarks premised on information market failures holds where consumer interest is high, but is far less relevant in markets where consumer
associations with brands are weak or purchasing is far less visible and personal. In these markets, the reputational concerns of businesses are the predominant factor.
B.

Certification Regimes in Practice: Forestry and Coffee

The success of certification programs depends strongly on market conditions.108 A central reason for this is that they operate in competitive environments where businesses and stakeholders are constantly evaluating their
relative value. These pressures are exacerbated by the large information spillovers (e.g., market demand, technical and cost information, demonstration
of program benefits) generated by certification programs and especially firstmovers.109 Market conditions thus may or may not lead to competition that
is constructive.110 As discussed above, if ecolabels compete directly with each
other, consumers may become overwhelmed or indifferent. Similarly, the
dilutive effect of competing green trademarks may cause businesses to question whether certification provides meaningful reputational protection, or
wasteful duplication could hobble certification programs by precluding them
106 See Chon, supra note 2, at 2335 (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 19:91 n.7).
107 Institut Nat’l Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1875, 1885 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
108 Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 152 (concluding that “[d]espite similar starting
positions, private regulation has had starkly divergent outcomes across different sectors”).
109 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-241 to -242; Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 62,
at 34; Carolyn Fischer & Thomas P. Lyon, Competing Environmental Labels, 23 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 692, 693–94 (2014) (describing the growing importance of competition
between certification regimes and examples in which industries establish their own competing certification system); Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary
Standards, Certification and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 141 (2013) (observing
that because certification regimes face competition, they “appear to respond to the competitive dynamic to choose the rules that will generate broad acceptance”).
110 Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 152, 178, 184 (describing the variation in outcomes
from competition between third-party and private-label standards in the forestry, coffee,
and textile industries).
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from attracting sufficient membership to cover their operational
expenses.111
In practice, competition may cause ecolabels to shift into parallel markets, but this is not inevitable as the experience with coffee certification will
demonstrate.112 Further, the low barrier to walking away from a certification
program, particularly for corporate stakeholders,113 heightens pressures on
negotiations over regulatory standards and procedures.114 Ultimately, the
balance of power turns on the degree to which the various stakeholders
believe that they need to work together.115 NGOs will seek to maximize market coverage and regulatory stringency, while businesses will focus on protecting their reputations and brands at the lowest cost. These power dynamics
will be mediated through the administrative structure and rules of the certifying organization, which, depending on the stakeholders’ interests, may be
subject to intense negotiations that result in more or less elaborate and costly
procedures.116 The challenge from a policymaking perspective is to fashion
trademark policies that facilitate cooperation and mitigate outcomes that can
undermine the effectiveness of certification programs.
The features of green certification marks that are distinctive from conventional source-designating trademarks are brought to light via specific
examples. We will briefly explore the operation of green trademarks in two
distinct sectors—forestry and coffee. The uses of certification marks in these
market sectors demonstrate above all that green trademarks are not monolithic and that the motivations for adopting them and the functions they
serve vary substantially depending on prevailing market conditions.
111 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES-14; Fischer & Lyon, supra note 109, at 693–94.
112 Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 807 (claiming that “[s]tandards setters observe and
position themselves vis-a-vis each other to control their identities in their interaction with
peers, thereby mutually adapting their sustainability standards”).
113 Id. at 798 (quoting a representative of Fairtrade International acknowledging that
certification organizations are “all pitching for companies’ business, [because] we all want
to grow our own label”).
114 AULD, supra note 39, at 13–15; BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES-14 (observing that
“[g]iven the tension and trade-offs between how difficult the standard is to meet and how
many enterprises will be able to adopt it, standards and certification systems make these
decisions about where to set the standard in varied, pragmatic, and often strenuously negotiated ways”); Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 62, at 33–34; Turcotte et al., supra note 61,
at 154, 171 (describing industry strategy of establishing its own standards as a response to
third-party certification programs).
115 Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 156 (describing the dependence of third-party standards on “whether companies feel that continuing the endorsement of a standard pays off
by attracting sufficient demand in the marketplace”).
116 See Erika N. Sasser et al., Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector, 8 BUS. & POL. 1, 3, 25 (2006); Timothy M. Smith &
Miriam Fischlein, Rival Private Governance Networks: Competing to Define the Rules of Sustainability Performance, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 511, 514–15 (2010). The ISEAL Alliance
has issued a framework for certification programs, “The Standard-Setting Code of Good
Practice.” STANDARD-SETTING CODE, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/ourwork/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-practice/standard-setting-code.

R
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Coffee: Green Trademarks and Information Overload

As a food product, coffee is less purely utilitarian and thus more personal than many other goods and services; consumption of coffee is also
more visible and social because consumers identify with certain brands and
local coffee shops.117 Coffee is a distinctive commodity in these respects,
and, unlike the market for forestry, the market for it is truly global—over
eighty percent of coffee is grown for export markets.118 Further, while coffee
growing is highly decentralized, a small number of major traders and coffee
roasters purchase fifty percent of the world’s annual coffee production.119
Among major coffee-growing countries, coffee is also critical economically
because it accounts for thirty to eighty percent of their foreign exchange.120
In part driven by these market conditions, coffee certification is notable for
the prominent role that NGOs, small producers, large coffee companies, and
consumers have each played in its evolution.121
The potential appeal to consumers and competitive value of green trademarks for coffee makers were recognized during the late 1980s when certification programs were first established.122 Following a series of high-profile
NGO campaigns against major coffee brands in the early 1990s, certification
achieved significant market penetration.123 However, the influence of these
campaigns did not result in NGO-led certification programs being universally
embraced; instead, many industry- and company-specific certification pro117 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 69 (singling out coffee as a “high-profile consumer
good[ ]” that is among a small number that reliably receives a price premium if certified);
Ken Peattie, Green Consumption: Behavior and Norms, 35 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 195,
197 (2010) (observing that “Fair Trade coffee is considered an archetypal socially motivated purchase”). The unique status of coffee for consumers is reflected in the fact that it
is “[t]he most important internationally traded certified commodit[y] by value.” BARRY ET
AL., supra note 4, at A-126.
118 JASON POTTS ET AL., THE STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES REVIEW 2014: STANDARDS AND THE GREEN ECONOMY 155 (2014), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/ssi_2014.pdf.
119 See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 794 (noting that “[a]n estimated 25 million
people around the world depend directly on coffee farming for their livelihoods” and
“[t]wo-thirds of them are smallholders”).
120 See AULD, supra note 39, at 120–21.
121 See David Levy et al., The Political Dynamics of Sustainable Coffee: Contested Value Regimes
and the Transformation of Sustainability, 53 J. MGMT. STUD. 364, 376 (2016) (stating that
NGOs “have played a key role in restructuring the coffee value regime by leveraging consumer trends to pressure coffee brands into adopting sustainable practices”). The authors
also claim that NGOs “leveraged an emerging consumer segment that fused demand for
premium speciality coffee with concerns regarding economic justice and sustainability.”
Id. at 380.
122 See Verena Bitzer et al., Intersectoral Partnerships for a Sustainable Coffee Chain: Really
Addressing Sustainability or Just Picking (Coffee) Cherries?, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 271, 273
(2008).
123 See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 794 (observing that “[f]ierce battles and campaigns by activists and consumers against well-known coffee brands made sustainability a
concern for many mainstream operators” (citation omitted)).
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grams were established as business-friendly alternatives.124 Consequently,
while forty percent of the coffee produced annually now meets at least minimum standards for sustainability, industry-led certification accounts for
twenty-three percent of the market whereas NGO-led programs account for
just seventeen percent.125 Further, extraordinary growth caused the supply
of sustainably produced coffee to exceed consumer demand, such that “producers typically sell[ ] only a portion of their standard-compliant production
as certified.”126
Rapid growth also stimulated a proliferation of certification programs,
each with their own criteria and methods.127 The complex mix of information that resulted has led to widespread consumer uncertainty about the environmental and other benefits of purchasing certified coffee.128 For
example, evaluating the meaning of third-party and private trademarks is
complicated by the different types (organic, fair trade, and environmental
sustainability) of certification programs that exist.129 Moreover, harmonization of the roughly thirty certification standards between and within the
three classes is limited, and only a small minority of the 395 programs available for organic certification are independently accredited.130
124 Examples of industry certification programs include “UTZ Certified” (1997), Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality (2003), and Starbucks’s C.A.F.E. Practices (2004), which
were often modeled on NGO certification standards. See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at
794–96. These standards often focus on quality characteristics as much as on sustainability.
Id.
125 See POTTS ET AL., supra note 118, at 166 (“Between 2008 and 2012, the production of
certified or verified coffee has grown from an estimated 15 to 40 per cent of global production today.”); Levy et al., supra note 121, at 380–81.
126 POTTS ET AL., supra note 118, at 183; see also BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-126
(noting that “much more coffee is sustainably produced than is sold as such”).
127 See Stephen Manning et al., National Contexts Matter: The Co-Evolution of Sustainability
Standards in Global Value Chains, 83 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197, 197 (2012) (noting that “[o]ver
the past twenty years, more than thirty corporate and multi-stakeholder standards have
been developed, including Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, Utz Kapeh, and the Common
Code for the Coffee Community which continue to co-exist”).
128 See AULD, supra note 39, at 90; BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-138 (concluding that
“[m]ultiple labels with similar claims and sometimes contradictory advice create uncertainty and confuse consumers, and ultimately reduce the credibility of certification systems”); Bitzer et al., supra note 122, at 278 (observing that “the emergence of [multiple]
sustainability standards has the potential to lead to substantial confusion for both producers and consumers in terms of the standards’ meaning, stringency and legitimacy”).
129 See AULD, supra note 39, at 6; Levy et al., supra note 121, at 376; Manning et al.,
supra note 127, at 197.
130 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 178, 180 (acknowledging that there are still
many standards, but arguing that this is mitigated by recent efforts at harmonization); see
also AULD, supra note 39, at 141 (noting that as of 2006 very few had accreditation from
IFOAM, the leading accreditor of agricultural commodities). Organic standards and
accreditation consolidated during the late 1990s and early 2000s, setting up the knowledge
and regulatory infrastructure for certifying organic coffee. Id. at 141. By contrast, inconsistencies persist for fair-trade labels, despite the establishment of the Fairtrade Labelling
Organization in 1997. Id. at 145.
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There are few signs that consolidation of coffee certification is likely to
occur in the foreseeable future.131 The marketing benefits and economics of
certified coffee,132 which is among the few commodities for which consumers
are willing to pay a premium,133 have created the demand from coffee roasters and retailers for a variety of certification standards.134 The apparent
indifference of consumers to the underlying standards implied by their limited understanding makes private green trademarks even more attractive for
marketing purposes, as they enable companies to distinguish the sustainability of their products based on low thresholds for credibility. Indeed,
the effectiveness of ecolabels may owe as much to providing social or identity
cues—consumers want to feel or demonstrate that they are environmentally
responsible—as to providing salient information.135
To the limited extent that cooperation has resulted in harmonization,136
the signs of its efficacy are mixed and contested. Most commentators believe
that NGO-led certification programs have been subject to greater pressures,
since they must attract businesses, and that “harmonization” has largely
entailed a weakening of standards.137 More recently, an emerging group of
commentators has argued that recent efforts to harmonize standards are not
nearly so one-sided, and that they reflect a “co-evolution” of standards that is
driven by a variety of considerations, including efforts to mitigate the high
costs of certification for small landholders, to enhance product quality, and
131 See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 804. Reinecke et al. quoted one sustainability
expert involved in early-2002 negotiations over the harmonization of coffee standards saying, “[T]here simply is no interest in consolidation, none at all. There are simply too many
groups involved—too many interests . . . . Obviously, there is no interest in seeing their
own standard disappear.” Id. at 804 (second alteration in original); see also Turcotte et al.,
supra note 61, at 156 (arguing that the divergence in preferences between NGOs, industry,
and consumers causes the multiplicity of standards).
132 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 68 (finding that “[o]ften the primary economic
benefit to producers of joining certification systems is stable and secure market access”).
133 See id. at ES-8, 69 (stating that “[p]rice premiums are fairly rare and are most consistently available for high-profile or niche items such as certified coffee and tea”); Bitzer et
al., supra note 122, at 277 (noting that “[f]or sustainable coffee, possibly of high quality,
farmers oftentimes receive price premiums or premium prices that contribute to a more
stable environment, confront the decline of coffee prices, and improve the distribution of
coffee income along the chain”). Price premiums for producers are highly variable and
differ between the various certification programs. See POTTS ET AL., supra note 118, at 181.
134 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 156.
135 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 50 (observing that “[i]n many cases, even consumer awareness of certification . . . is modest, and varies by country and system”).
136 See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 809 (stating that “[i]n the coffee industry,
cooperation [over sustainability standards], although increasing, is in its infancy”).
137 See, e.g., Bitzer et al., supra note 122, at 278 (“The lack of a generally accepted definition of sustainable coffee also results in considerable competition among the standards.
There is the danger of older sustainability standards being pushed back or even replaced
by newer, less stringent standards.”); Levy et al., supra note 121, at 381 (“Over time, NGOs
realigned their values with those of coffee firms and a broader consumer base. NGO-led
standard-setters reframed their aims as ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘sustainable development’
rather than a new economic order, much to the dismay of some early pioneers.”).
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to provide technical support to producers.138 Nevertheless, despite recent
cooperation on metaprotocols for coffee certification,139 even a generous
reading of current trends indicates that certification standards with widely
varying qualitative and quantitative differences will remain the norm in
global coffee markets.
In this context, the potential for consumer misunderstanding is substantial, both because there are significant incentives for aggressive industry marketing and because consumers are in a weak position to independently
evaluate the attributes of credence goods.140 Moreover, major coffee roasters can “have their cake and eat it too,” insofar as they have successfully introduced both industry-led and private certification standards, which in effect
empower them to set their own standards and exert downward pressure on
the NGO-led certification programs with which they compete.141 The success of this strategy is reflected in the fact that, outside the relatively niche
markets for specialty coffee, neither consumer demand nor reputational concerns have led to widespread adoption of NGO-led coffee certification.142
2.

Forestry: Green Trademarks as Reputational Shields

Concerns about global deforestation first ignited around dramatic losses
of tropical rainforests in South America and Asia.143 As noted above, it was
the failure of international negotiations and limited options at the national
level that prompted NGOs and foundations to embrace a private, market138 See, e.g., Levy et al., supra note 121, at 393 (concluding that both nongovernmental
organizations and businesses influence the structure and evolution of private governance);
Stephan Manning & Juliane Reinecke, A Modular Governance Architecture In-The-Making:
How Transnational Standard-Setters Govern Sustainability Transitions, 45 RES. POL’Y 618, 622
(2016) (describing the increases in quality and support for producers that industry pressures helped to promote); Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 805 (arguing that changes have
been driven by “pressure to reduce the costs incurred by multiple certification schemes
and the related threat to the collective legitimacy of sustainability standards”); Turcotte et
al., supra note 61, at 163, 177, 182 (arguing that NGO calls to harmonize standards are
driven by concerns about costs to small producers and the competition with industry standards provides an impetus for constructive collaboration).
139 See Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 805 (arguing that the ISEAL metastandards
could “lead to further convergence” of existing standards).
140 See Levy et al., supra note 121, at 381 (observing that “[m]ainstream coffee brands
thus turned activist pressures and reputational threats into a strategic opportunity to
develop sustainable coffee into branded premium market niches”).
141 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at ES-14 (acknowledging that critiques based on the
competition between certification programs “highlight the concern that voluntary standards have limits in terms of both the extent of change they can bring about and the
proportion of a market they can affect”); Levy et al., supra note 121, at 382 (describing
how, after introducing their own programs, “[c]offee firms now enjoyed many options to
demonstrate their corporate responsibility, creating pressure on NGOs”).
142 See POTTS ET AL., supra note 118, at 166.
143 See AULD, supra note 39, at 166.
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based approach to protecting them.144 The FSC was created from this innovative collaboration,145 but disagreement persisted over the value of forest
certification within the environmental community. This ambivalence led to
lukewarm support from more radical groups and campaigns that urged preservation over sustainable management,146 both of which undermined the
reputational value of FSC certification for businesses. Ultimately, the technical demands and costs of forest certification limited the number of programs,
and the absence of viable alternatives overcame the balkanization within the
environmental community.147 Today the FSC and the Program for the
Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) oversee most forest certification
today.148
The initial premise of forest certification was that consumer choice facilitated by product labeling and public information campaigns would reorient
the industry toward sustainable management. It soon became apparent, however, that the fragmented market for forest products was a structural barrier
to consumer-driven market pressures.149 Typically less than fifteen percent
of wood harvested globally is sold into export markets,150 and the largest
markets in countries such as China and Japan are not ones in which consumers are sensitized to forestry issues or necessarily in a position to pay higher
prices.151 Outside of Europe and North America, these realities have largely
limited forest certification to countries in which the forestry sector is reliant
on markets—particularly the European Union—that demand certifica144 See BARRY ET AL ., supra note 4, at 6–7 (describing how a group of NGOs in 1993
reached out to progressive companies to agree on a core set of principles and criteria for
sustainable forest management); Bartley, supra note 34, at 320, 322–23; Turcotte et al.,
supra note 61, at 166 (noting that the principal impasse was strong disagreement over
national versus global rights and responsibilities over forests).
145 BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 20; Bartley, supra note 34, at 320, 322–23.
146 See AULD, supra note 39, at 103–104 (noting that the experience with old growth
battles in British Columbia suggested that “FSC [certification] would not be enough to
prevent further scrutiny and criticism from NGOs, and it might actually spur more”).
147 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 177 (noting the importance of “[t]he environmental movement coalesc[ing] behind the pioneering global forest standard FSC, thereby
probably preventing the introduction of multiple NGO-led standards”).
148 Id. (describing the “duopolistic competition between the FSC and PEFC” standards); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 149.
149 See AULD, supra note 39, at 59 (describing the fragmented market for solid wood
products; only retailers, such as Home Depot (ten percent of the global lumber market),
are concentrated). By contrast, the pulp and paper industry is geographically concentrated in North America (forty percent), Europe (twenty-nine percent), and Asia (twentythree percent). Id. at 58. Office supply stores are also highly concentrated—the four largest firms account for seventy-eight percent of total U.S. sales. Id. at 59.
150 See id. at 54, 60 (noting that fifty percent of wood harvest globally is used directly for
fuel and that industrial round wood exports were just 7.5% of total production in 2005).
151 “In 1992, China, Japan, Thailand, and Korea imported 80 percent of world exports
of tropical industrial round wood,” with Japan importing forty-five percent of the total. Id.
at 61. Much of this wood, however, is re-exported to Europe and the United States in the
form of finished products. Id.
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tion.152 The complexity of the technical issues underlying the certification
process, conflicts between environmental groups, and the difficulty of retaining sufficient industry support for the program have further complicated the
FSC’s efforts to inform and appeal to consumers.153
The strength and influence of the FSC program has instead rested on
the reputational concerns of major retailers and, to a lesser extent, on the
environmental commitments of smaller wood products manufacturers.154
Large retailers in Europe and the United States were high-profile early adopters in 1991 when they made commitments to sell certified wood products and
collect reliable information on their supply chains.155 This shift was precipitated by major NGO campaigns on forestry issues, which were complemented
in the United States by threats from the FTC to file false claims suits for
misleading advertising.156 NGO activism and government pressure together
activated industry reputational concerns, whereas consumer influence was
and continues to be indirect—it is based on industry fears of a consumer
boycott following damning exposés and long-term reputational impacts.157
The early success of the FSC was followed by rising industry discontent
with the complexity of its standards and NGO control over its governance.158
This backlash prompted the entry of new certification programs, foremost
among them the industry-led PEFC.159 It has also resulted in industry
retrenchment, which has included decisions by major retailers, such as Home
Depot, to stop stocking FSC-certified products, both because simpler systems
152 See id. at 139; BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-97 to A-98; Turcotte et al., supra note
61, at 168 (noting that “certification remains concentrated in the northern hemisphere,
with 58% of certified forests being in North America and 33% in Europe”).
153 See AULD, supra note 39, at 106 (describing how during the early stages of forest
certification, small manufacturers played a critical role in supporting and advocating on
behalf of its adoption within the industry); Bartley, supra note 34, at 318.
154 See BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION
AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 10 (2004).
155 See Bartley, supra note 34, at 323; Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 168–69.
156 See AULD, supra note 39, at 76–77; Bartley, supra note 34; Turcotte et al., supra note
61, at 168–69. The National Association of Attorneys General also threatened to file suits.
See AULD, supra note 39, at 76–77.
157 AULD, supra note 39, at 108 (noting that “forest product companies did indeed
struggle from a collective reputation and this did lead them to favor a global response”);
Bartley, supra note 34, at 323–24 (observing that “activist pressure led some image-conscious firms to support external certification systems”).
158 See AULD, supra note 39, at 79 (observing that a central reason for industry discontent was that seventy-five percent of the FSC governing board was allocated to NGOs);
BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-93.
159 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 167 (describing the establishment of the PEFC
and other regional industry-backed certification programs “as a direct response to the creation of the FSC” (quoting Benjamin Cashore et al., Forest Certification (Ecolabeling) Programs
and Their Policy-Making Authority: Explaining Divergence Among North American and European
Case Studies, 5 J. FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 225, (2003))). Ultimately, the various industrybacked certification programs were consolidated into the PEFC. Id. at 19.
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were available and consumers were unwilling to pay a “green premium.”160
These threats unified NGO support for the FSC program and protected it
against a wave of new entrants, but the experience highlights the unstable
position of even well-established certification programs.161 The spread of
forest certification continues, but it has evolved effectively into a duopoly
between the FSC and PEFC programs.162
The principal lesson that forest certification teaches is the synergistic
importance of corporate reputational sensitivities and NGO campaigns that
exploit them.163 The use of certification marks to inform consumers and
generate market demand for certified products meeting high standards for
sustainability is a secondary factor limited to niche markets regionally. Consumer influence instead operates indirectly and negatively in the form of
industry concerns about potential boycotts or, in the case of retailers, tarnishment of their brands. In this context, the central problem is downward competition, or so-called “races to the bottom” between leading certification
programs, as opposed to consumer information overload and lost efficacy of
ecolabels.
Experience with coffee and forest certification regimes highlights the
respective virtues of consumer- and reputation-oriented green trademarks.
Consumer-oriented certification is facilitated by marketing benefits that
incentivize adoption by prominent businesses, but these market forces also
attract competing certification entities, which can lead to competition that
erodes the communicative function of ecolabels.164 Further, the information
overload created by multiple competing standards can make consumers especially vulnerable to aggressive branding used in conjunction with private
trademarks.165 By contrast, reputation-oriented certification is relatively
immune to information overload because it is used defensively and is rarely
associated with marketing strategies. Instead, the challenge is regressive competition between independent third-party certification standards and industry-led certification programs that is driven by the need for all third-party
160 AULD, supra note 39, at 82 (noting that Home Depot made the decision after having
received a Sustainable Development Award from the President for its sustainability
policies).
161 See id. at 79–82; Sasser et al., supra note 116, at 27–28 (describing the challenges of
maintaining industry buy-in to certification in the forestry sector).
162 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 169 (“After a period of fragmentation, industryled standards consolidated their efforts which resulted in a duopoly between the industryled PEFC and the NGO-led FSC.”).
163 See Fransen & Conzelmann, supra note 30, at 261 (describing the importance of
reputation to the consolidation of certification regimes in specific industrial sectors).
164 See Harbaugh et al., supra note 24, at 1524.
165 Consistent with this observation, one prominent recent report concluded that “multiple labels with different claims and sometimes contradictory advice can create uncertainty
and confusion in consumers’ minds. A key implication, then, is that consumer demand
alone is unlikely to support a large-scale shift toward the use of certification and labeling
systems, especially in product categories outside of organic agriculture.” BARRY ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 50 (citations omitted).
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programs to attract and retain business clients.166 These dynamics expose
both the challenges and importance of consumer engagement, or at least the
threat of it—making the environmental issues salient to consumers is an
essential precondition for the success of all certification programs.167 The
limiting cases discussed here are relevant to many other sectors, including
marine fisheries, other agricultural commodities (such as palm oil, cocoa,
and tea), and outside considerations of sustainability and fair labor practices.168 Thus, while many hybrid cases exist—indeed, the coffee sector itself
has consumer and reputational elements—and while the degree to which
either limiting case dominates will vary, the coffee and forestry sectors
broadly capture how ecolabels and certification programs operate.
II. CHALLENGES

FOR

TRADEMARK LAW

AND

THEORY

The information overload and regressive races to the bottom found in
the coffee and forestry sectors illustrate the negative marketplace interactions that can arise between conventional trademarks and certification
marks. In the case of coffee, consumer misunderstanding arose when the
information reflected in conventional trademarks and certification marks
overwhelmed consumers’ ability to distinguish between them.169 This was
acute because market forces have caused private ecolabels to proliferate170—
in effect, a tragedy of the information commons.171 This creates a pernicious cycle because as the number of private trademarks increases, the value
of certification marks declines,172 which in turn shifts the strategic choice
166 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 153–55.
167 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at A-94 to A-95 (concluding that although to date
consumers have played a secondary role, “[t]his does not mean that consumers are unimportant for certification—indeed some argue that if certification is to have truly transformative impacts, consumers will have to play a much more active and informed role”).
168 See id. at ES-4, 9; Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 170–74.
169 See Harbaugh et al., supra note 24, at 1512 (highlighting how “confusion by consumers is widely blamed for undermining the credibility of ecolabels, thereby reducing the
incentive for firms to adopt them”); Ralph E. Horne, Limits to Labels: The Role of Eco-Labels
in the Assessment of Product Sustainability and Routes to Sustainable Consumption, 33 INT’L J.
CONSUMER STUD. 175, 179 (2009) (describing how “[t]he increased number of voluntary
eco-labels in the market place has resulted in consumer confusion between third-party
certi?ed and self-declared labels”); John Thøgersen, How May Consumer Policy Empower Consumers for Sustainable Lifestyles?, 28 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 143, 158 (2005) (describing the
heightened barriers to effectiveness when multiple ecolabels exist in a market segment).
170 See supra subsection I.B.2.
171 The number of green trademarks is large and increasing rapidly—in 2007, the U.S
Patent and Trademark Office received more than 300,000 applications for green trademarks for brand names, logos, and taglines. OTTMAN, supra note 5, at 12; Green is the New
Black, supra note 5.
172 See Brécard, supra note 24, at 65 (noting that “[s]ome labels are rigorously certified
by a third-party, such as a public institute or a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO),
but others arise from self-declarations by firms”); Sihem Dekhili & Mohamed Akli
Achabou, Eco-Labelling Brand Strategy: Independent Certification Versus Self-Declaration, 26 EUR.
BUS. REV. 305, 319 (2014) (finding, in an empirical study on consumer preference for
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towards private trademarks over third-party certification. From the standpoint of trademark theory, this dynamic illustrates why policies for conventional trademarks and certification marks cannot be set in isolation of each
other.173
Elements of regressive competition exist in both the coffee and forestry
sectors, but the conditions are quite different. We have identified two main
driving forces: (1) competitive pressures from other certifying entities, both
NGO- and industry-led but particularly the latter; and (2) the option that all
businesses have of establishing their own private ecolabel under a conventional trademark. In either case, the competitive pressures can propel a
“race to the bottom” in which independent third-party certification programs
relax their standards to retain users,174 much as states are alleged to relax
environmental regulations to attract or retain industries for economic reasons.175 The industry-led PEFC program illustrates the first dynamic, as it has
put downward pressure on certification standards in the forestry sector and
surpassed the once-dominant NGO-led FSC program.176 The second
coffee, that “self-declaration has the same effect as that of independent certification”);
Fischer & Lyon, supra note 109, at 692–93 (“More recently, there has been a growing
proliferation of labels, as multiple groups enter the labeling marketplace. Of particular
interest are situations in which industry has responded to an NGO label with its own certification standards that employ alternative criteria, which are typically less stringent than
those used by the NGO.”); Guillaume P. Gruère, An Analysis of the Growth in Environmental
Labelling and Information Schemes, 38 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 1, 2 (2014) (describing the problem with “proliferat[ing]” environmental labeling regimes); Reinecke et al., supra note 20,
at 792 (describing how “multiple overlapping standards, developed by both social movement organizations and firms, co-exist and compete for adopters in the same sector despite
being similar in design, content and intentions to regulate the transnational arena”);
Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 152, 156 (observing that “[m]any sectors have seen the
emergence of multiple standards that address the same issues” and that this often causes
consumer confusion).
173 See BARRY ET AL., supra note 4, at 50.
174 See Fransen & Conzelmann, supra note 30, at 260 (observing that a “race to the
bottom” may arise because businesses can choose between certification programs, creating
“a gravitational effect to the most lenient standards up to the point where the effectiveness
of a [program] is in question”); Levy et al., supra note 121, at 365 (describing a critical view
of certification that mirrors a race to the bottom insofar as “[s]tandards developed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly resemble those promulgated by business
in promoting these market-oriented goals”); Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 177 (suggesting that “the introduction of industry-sponsored standards, if successful, may increase
the risk of a ‘race-to-the-bottom’”).
175 See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1802–07 (2008); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977).
176 For example, the establishment of the industry-led PEFC certification program had
a significant impact on the independent third-party FSC program. Reinecke et al., supra
note 20, at 793 (describing how “as these ‘sustainable’ product markets evolve and mature,
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dynamic is illustrated by the pernicious cycle noted above in the coffee sector, where the proliferation of private ecolabels has contributed to information overload and a downward pressure on certification standards.
The prevalence of competing ecolabels is uncontroversial and widely
regarded by commentators as a source of significant concern.177 However,
much like the divided literature on environmental federalism,178 the significance of competitive “races to the bottom” for ecolabels as a form of private
governance is hotly contested. Prominent commentators lie on either side of
the debate,179 with views often turning on whether the proliferation of ecolabels is a sign of healthy regulatory experimentation or whether it is more
likely to result in downward competition.180 We cannot resolve this issue
here, but the anecdotal evidence of the pressures on independent certification organizations is sobering and reinforced by the obvious strategic value
and narrow constituencies of industry-led certification programs.181 Regulatory races to the bottom may not always be a significant issue, but we believe
that the incentives for abuse are sufficient to warrant government policies to
guard against their occurrence.
they become increasingly fragmented as other social movement- and industry-driven standards providers enter the market with their own versions of sustainability standards”).
177 See supra Section I.B.
178 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 175, at 1802–03.
179 See Luc Fransen, Why Do Private Governance Organizations Not Converge? A PoliticalInstitutional Analysis of Transnational Labor Standards Regulation, 24 GOVERNANCE 359, 361
(2011) (claiming that “[f]ears of a race to the bottom that waters down existing
approaches may further stimulate collective intervention”); Fransen & Conzelmann, supra
note 30, at 260 (describing the positions of the “optimists” and “pessimists” regarding certification-based private governance); Levy et al., supra note 121, at 365 (describing the position on both sides of the debates); Reinecke et al., supra note 20, at 792 (describing the
debate as turning on “whether standards multiplicity leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ or
‘healthy competition’, driving private rule-setters ‘to continually innovate, and, in fact,
increase their effectiveness’” (quoting Joint Statement, Fairtrade Int’l, Sustainable Agric.
Network, Rainforest All. & Utz Certified (Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.fairtrade.net/
fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/news/releases_statements/2011-02_joint-statement-FLO-RA-UTZ-Final.pdf).
180 See, e.g., Manning & Reinecke, supra note 138, at 628 (suggesting that the varied
“participatory architectures” of certification programs “allow[ ] diverse and heterogeneous
actors within global transition networks to interact constructively” and this “facilitates
‘experimentalist governance’ in sustainability transitions, in particular in transnational
domains, like the global coffee sector” (some internal quotation marks omitted) (first
quoting FABRIZIO FERRARO ET AL., TACKLING GRAND CHALLENGES PRAGMATICALLY: ROBUST
ACTION REVISITED 23 (2014); and then quoting Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed.,
2012))).
181 See Turcotte et al., supra note 61, at 167–68 (describing the establishment of the
PEFC, and other regional industry-backed certification programs “as a direct response to
the creation of the FSC” (quoting Benjamin Cashore et al., Forest Certification (Ecolabeling)
Programs and Their Policy-Making Authority: Explaining Divergence Among North American and
European Case Studies, 5 J. FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 225, (2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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The discussion below describes the details of trademark theory and the
conditions that have shaped it. Two factors are of particular importance: the
seemingly inexorable expansion of trademark rights over the past several
decades and the perceived absence of any normative bases or public interests
that could justify this trend. We share the skepticism of many scholars about
the scope of trademark rights, but we ultimately conclude that it reflects an
overly restrictive view of trademark policy and the public interests at stake.
Moreover, it betrays a set of normative preferences about the appropriate
role of trademarks and a depoliticized vision of consumer markets that is
belied by the growing importance of private governance. Using these points
as a springboard, the final Part of the Article outlines several policies that
would mitigate the parochialism of trademark policy.
A.

Trademark Orthodoxy

Our central thesis is that the rise of ecolabels as a form of private governance requires the preoccupations of neoliberal trademark theory to be
reconsidered. Trademark theory limits consideration of general public welfare to facilitating marketplace competition by virtue of its near exclusive
reliance on source designation for its normative grounding.182 This
depoliticized vision of trademark law is premised on the belief that trademarks need only direct consumers to the single anonymous source of a good
or service.183 Beyond that, trademarks are assumed to have no normatively
justified operational value.184 And yet, as ecolabels and other market-based
activism demonstrate, the public interests implicated by trademarks—congestion problems and races to the bottom—are substantially broader than conventional theory admits. We believe that these interests have been obscured
by concerns about the expanding range of trademark rights asserted by businesses—accompanied by supporting doctrinal and legislative changes—that
have preoccupied trademark scholarship. While undoubtedly important,
these developments have spawned a movement that is overly restrictive insofar as it treats any trademark rights beyond those in service of the signaling
function as normatively suspect.
Stated more precisely, the orthodox theory maintains that trademark
rights are justified to the extent that they are necessary for a trademark to
182 See Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Note, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection”: Control of Quality and Dilution—Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 67–68
(1990).
183 See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
184 Analogous issues came to the surface in the debate between scholars over the
“trademark use” doctrine. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 41, at 138; Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark M. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703
(2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007). In part, this controversy concerned whether treating
“trademark use” as a filtering doctrine in the infringement context limited (and, normatively, should limit) trademark rights to a narrow range of functions associated with
preventing consumer confusion in a narrow range of contexts. Id. at 1670.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL206.txt

738

unknown

Seq: 30

notre dame law review

28-DEC-17

10:24

[vol. 93:2

operate as a word or symbol indicating the origin of a commercial product.185 Protecting rights in a trademark enables consumers to find the
sources of goods and services they seek because other firms are precluded
from using the mark in the same trade context.186 Trademark rights also
enable firms to internalize their investments in the quality of their goods or
services because they prevent other businesses from free riding on the goodwill such investments generate.187
While trademarks operate in the service of consumer sovereignty,188 the
terrain over which the consumer rules is quite confined. From the consumer’s perspective, trademarks promote product quality and market competition by providing consumers with the information they need to satisfy their
individual preferences for goods.189 From the perspective of trademark
orthodoxy, the relevant preferences that trademark law facilitates are limited
to purely instrumental preferences for goods or services from specific
sources.190 Other kinds of preferences or values are irrelevant to core trademark doctrines. As a result, conventional trademark principles cannot assist
185 In the modern consumer marketplace, a trademark often operates as a symbol of a
single anonymous source of products or services. It is not necessary for consumers to know
the actual physical source of products and services. Indeed, with many goods whose manufacture involves chains of licenses for the manufacture of componentry, the idea of a single
physical source has increasingly become unrealistic. See Manhattan Shirt Co. v. SarnoffIrving Hat Stores, Inc., 164 A. 246, 250 (Del. Ch. 1933), aff’d, 180 A. 928 (Del. 1934) (per
curiam) (noting that “the purchaser of goods bearing a given label believes that what he
buys emanated from the source, whatever its name or place, from which goods bearing
that label have always been derived”).
186 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In principle,
trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s]
the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the
past.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11,
§ 2:01(2))); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (“A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants.”). The search costs rationale
has also received strong endorsement from federal courts of appeals, most prominently the
Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 510 (“The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier
of the particular source of particular goods.”).
187 See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877) (“[T]he court proceeds on the
ground that the complainant has a valuable interest in the good-will of his trade or business, and, having adopted a particular label, sign, or trade-mark, indicating to his customers that the article bearing it is made or sold by him or by his authority, or that he carries
on business at a particular place, he is entitled to protection against one who attempts to
deprive him of his trade or customers by using such labels, signs, or trade-mark without his
knowledge or consent.”).
188 DON SLATER, CONSUMER CULTURE & MODERNITY 34 (1997) (discussing the power of
the image of the sovereign consumer in modern capitalist discourse).
189 See Tal, supra note 14, at 29.
190 See generally Kysar, supra note 13.
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where, as a result of marketplace conditions, ecolabels enable consumers to
clearly distinguish between the sources of goods, but remain largely in the
dark as to the content of the environmental claims that the ecolabel purports
to convey.
These principles are reflected in the core doctrines that define the scope
of trademark rights and the objectives of trademark policy. For our purposes, core trademark doctrines are important because they have direct and
indirect impacts on the efficacy of ecolabels protected by certification marks.
They have direct effects because the registration191 and protection of conventional trademarks and certification marks are governed by the same rules;
most of the core doctrines for conventional trademarks are also applicable to
certification marks.192 They have indirect effects because certification marks
and conventional trademarks operate side-by-side in the same markets. Most
importantly, legal doctrines that allow conventional trademarks to proliferate
undermine the efficacy of certification marks when they cause consumers to
become overwhelmed by competing standards and technical information
even if they are not confused about the sources of goods or services.193
Trademark doctrines are designed to balance the twin objectives of minimizing consumer search costs, understood in this limited sense, and preserving market competition. This balancing is reflected in the spectrum of
standards for the four classes of marks—arbitrary or fanciful, suggestive,
descriptive, and generic.194 The bar for obtaining trademark protection for
arbitrary or fanciful marks, which have no suggestive or descriptive meaning,
is de minimis because protecting such marks is unlikely to impede communication which is essential to market competition.195 Suggestive marks, which
connote some characteristic or quality of a product or service,196 are also
191 In rare cases, unregistered certification marks have been recognized. See, e.g., Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428, 431 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (holding that the Lanham
Act encompasses protection of unregistered common law certification marks).
192 As noted above, the key distinctions concern technical rules associated with ownership and prohibitions against certifiers discriminating as between potential users. See supra
text accompanying notes 15–18.
193 See BARRY ET AL ., supra note 4, at 50.
194 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). The Court in
Two Pesos cited Judge Friendly’s famous statement in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc.: “Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.” 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 162–63 (2008). Examples of “generic” trademarks include aspirin,
thermos, and zipper.
195 Arbitrary marks do not describe or suggest anything about the product or services
marketed under the mark. See Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 611
n.2 (7th Cir. 1965). Fanciful marks are coined words invented or selected in order to act as
a trademark. See id.
196 Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding that suggestive trademarks require some “imagination, thought and per-
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readily granted for the same reason.197 To give just one example, the trademark “Q-Tips” for cotton swabs, which are often used with infants, is suggestive198 because it could be associated with a quality of “cuteness.”199 Yet,
suggestive marks do not require empirical proof of “secondary meaning,”
which requires that a mark operate as a signal of a product’s source as
opposed to its qualities.200 By contrast, marks that are explicitly descriptive
of a good or service201 require proof of secondary meaning,202 and generic
marks are afforded no protection at all because it is presumed that the value
ception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods” (citing William R. Warner & Co. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 528 (1924))).
197 See, e.g., Watkins Prods., Inc. v. Sunway Fruit Prods., Inc., 311 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir.
1962); see also Audio Fid., Inc. v. London Records, Inc., 332 F.2d 577, 579 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(“It is well settled that a mark which is ‘suggestive’ as opposed to ‘merely descriptive’ is a
valid technical trademark. It is entitled to protection and to registration without proof of
secondary meaning.”).
198 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Int’l Jensen Inc., 963 F.2d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“ACOUSTIC
RESEARCH” for stereo loudspeakers); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“At-A-Glance” for calendars).
199 See Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953).
200 Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks are regarded as inherently distinctive, and
do not require a showing of secondary meaning (or acquired distinctiveness) to achieve
protection. See Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.
1961). In Q-Tips, Inc., the Third Circuit described the line-drawing required between
descriptive and suggestive marks and the underlying policy concerns, as follows:
It is desirable to protect a trader who has built up public association with a product under his trade-mark from having his business taken by somebody else. It is
also desirable to keep the channels of expression open by not giving protection to
people who go out and take ordinary, descriptive words and then claim something like a property right in them.
206 F.2d at 146; see also Stix Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. at 488.
201 Descriptive trademarks cannot act as “signifiers of source” (absent secondary meaning) because they signify something else—that which the mark describes. See Publ’ns Int’l,
Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1998). Marks will be characterized as
“descriptive” if they describe: (a) “the intended purpose, function or use of the goods”; (b)
“the size of the goods”; (c) “the provider of the goods or services”; (d) “the class of users of
the goods or services” (e.g., users within a particular geographical region); (e) “a desirable
characteristic of the goods or services”; (f) “the sound made by an important feature of the
goods”; (g) “the nature of the goods or services”; (h) “the end effect upon the user.” 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:16 (4th ed.
2017). On the necessity to prove “secondary meaning” (that is, through advertising and
use, consumers come to distinguish the trademark owner’s goods from those of other traders). See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920).
202 Whether a mark achieves secondary meaning is largely an empirical issue, in the
assessment of which survey evidence is often particularly important. See Aloe Creme Labs.,
Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The chief inquiry is the attitude of
the consumer toward the mark; does it denote to him a, ‘single thing coming from a single
source’? Short of a survey, this is difficult of direct proof.” (quoting Coca-Cola Co., 254 U.S.
at 146)); see also Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 119 (5th Cir. 1979) (absence of
an objective survey is a significant hindrance to meeting the required standard of proof).
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of their linguistic meaning in market transactions far exceeds the benefits of
granting them trademark protection.203
Categorizing trademarks along this spectrum fosters competition by
ensuring that competitors can describe their products without infringing
others’ trademarks.204 By leaving purely descriptive and generic terms in the
public domain, these doctrines aim to enhance the clarity of information
conveyed to consumers about the qualities of goods and services.205 If, for
example, a single firm could monopolize the term “king size” for men’s
clothing,206 consumer search costs would be higher because other firms
would be impeded from communicating that they also sell products of this
description.207 Further, the doctrine serves a procompetitive end by constraining firms from artificially differentiating their products and thereby limiting competition between different brands of products that are functionally
the same.208
Consistent with trademark theory’s focus on competition, the distinctiveness doctrine is designed to allow many trademarks to coexist in the same
market.209 Yet, while the doctrine preserves competition by mitigating confusion as to source, the policy aim of maximizing the number of trademarks
in a market, and thus competitors, ignores the risk of information overload
that we have highlighted and the impediments it creates to consumer choice
203 Genericness is determined by asking first what the genus of goods is, and then
whether the term sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public as referring
primarily to that genus. See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, 782 F. 2d
987, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Generic terms are common names that the relevant purchasing
public understands primarily as describing the genus of goods or services being sold. They
are by definition incapable of indicating a particular source of the goods or services . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d
1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 1999); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 201, § 12:1. While “generic” terms are
not valid trademarks, in shaping an injunction, some relief might be afforded in cases of
passing off. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963). Like other trademarks, certification marks can be struck from the register if they
become generic. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012); Swiss Watch Int’l, Inc. v. Fed’n of the Swiss
Watch Indus., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1731 (T.T.A.B. 2012).
204 For example, the distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks is often
tested by assessing whether competitors would be likely to use the term when describing
their products. See, e.g., Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 116.
205 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9.
206 See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464, 471 (4th Cir. 1996).
207 See Austin, supra note 194, at 161. Defenses for descriptive uses of trademarks are
available in some circumstances. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). However, as the Court held in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., the
availability of statutory defenses will depend on the likelihood that the junior user’s use of
the mark causes a likelihood of consumer confusion. Id. at 112.
208 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). In this
context, product differentiation occurs when the trademark creates a unique product category. See generally Harold R. Weinberg, Is the Monopoly Theory of Trademarks Robust or a Bust?,
13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 148 (2005).
209 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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when a product has credence characteristics.210 The narrow focus of trademark theory on source designation as the sole arbiter of market competition
both ignores the complexities of consumer preferences and the potential for
trademarks to serve other normatively desirable ends. As a result, orthodox
trademark theory is either unconcerned with or, as we discuss below, disparaging of information that a mark might convey other than information
designating the source of a product or service.
These doctrinal limitations are reflected in recent cases involving ecolabels before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). For example,
the term “green” itself must typically be disclaimed due to its descriptive or
suggestive qualities.211 This does not, of course, preclude the use of “green”
in a firm’s branding strategies; it merely prohibits claiming the term as part
of a protected mark, and thus allows for widespread use of the term in any
market. The TTAB has also treated marks as descriptive if they connote the
environmental friendliness of a product or service,212 and it has occasionally
refused to register marks on the statutory ground that they are “misdescriptive” or “deceptive.”213 In one case involving the application to register
“GREEN SEAL,” the Board took the view that the mark should not be registered because the applicant did not provide any evidence that the products
were environmentally friendly.214 However, this standard is weak, and in
practice the doctrine has not provided a meaningful basis for weeding out or
limiting the number of green trademarks.215 The refusal to register a mark
210 See Bonroy & Constantatos, supra note 28, at 256–57.
211 See, e.g., In re Kitaru Innovations Inc., 2013 WL 3090489, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 26,
2013) (citing examples); see also In re Dayton Power & Light Co., 2012 WL 1267908, at *5
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2012) (“GREEN is a descriptive term to designate environmentally
friendly goods or services and that a disclaimer was appropriate.”).
212 For example, “GREEN SPROUTS” was refused registration for baby foods on the
ground that it would be regarded as an environmentally friendly version of goods marketed or intended to be marketed under the trademark SPROUT. In re I Play.Inc., 2013
WL 2951810 (T.T.A.B. May 14, 2013). Similarly, the term “ECO WICK” for candles was
found to merely connote “ecologically positive properties” and was refused registration. In
re MVP Grp. Int’l, Inc., 2013 WL 3001476, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2013). Applying the
doctrine of foreign equivalents, the Board rejected an application for VERDE for an electronic power supply technology on the basis that it was the Spanish word for “green” and
would be read to identify “environmentally friendly products and services in the electrical
supply industry.” In re Verde Power Supply, Inc., 2012 WL 4361423, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Sept.
12, 2012); see also Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents,
foreign words from common languages are translated into English to determine genericness, descriptiveness, as well as similarity of connotation in order to ascertain confusing
similarity with English word marks.”). For earlier examples of the PTO’s skepticism of
“green” trademarks, see In re Cenveo Corp., 2009 WL 4086560, at *6 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 30,
2009); In re Bargoose Home Textiles Inc., 2009 WL 1719383, at *4 (T.T.A.B. May 27,
2009); In re Jones Inv. Co., 2009 WL 273242, at *1–3 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2009).
213 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (a) (2012).
214 In re Kitaru Innovations Inc., 2013 WL 3090489, at *5.
215 For a mark to be characterized as deceptive, an affirmative answer to each of the
following questions is required: (1) Is the term misdescriptive of the character, quality,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL206.txt

unknown

Seq: 35

28-DEC-17

2017] t r a d e m a r k s a n d p r i v a t e e n v i r o n m e n t a l g o v e r n a n c e

10:24

743

(or the imposition of a requirement to disclaim a term such as “green”) does
not preclude a firm’s use of the mark in its communication to consumers. It
merely constrains the ability of firms to claim exclusive rights in the term.
The narrow focus of trademark law obviates the need for an extended
examination of the legal doctrines for the simple reason that, beyond undifferentiated market competition, it ignores market failures, informational or
otherwise, that are implicated by trademark rights. Under TTAB jurisprudence, “green” must be disclaimed if it has any connection with consumer
preferences for making environmentally responsible purchasing decisions.216
Similarly, the prohibition against deceptively misdescriptive marks applies
only if there are no credible environmental characteristics associated with the
product or service.217 Ecolabels for products with some environmental quality are unlikely to be expunged on the deceptively misdescriptive ground,
and trademarks that connote environmental qualities, but are not directly
descriptive, will be allowed to proliferate. The core trademark doctrines are
therefore indifferent to ecolabels operating effectively and more broadly in
this form of private governance.
B.

Critiques of Expanded Trademark Rights

Trademark scholars have engaged in a sometimes quixotic battle against
modern branding strategies that maximize the surplus value of trademarks
through expanded trademark rights.218 This preoccupation has reinforced
the orthodox strain in trademark theory and profoundly impacted scholarfunction, composition or use of the goods? (2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to
believe that the misdescription actually describes the goods? (3) If so, is the misdescription likely to affect the decision to purchase? In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). An alternative ground for refusal is that a mark is “deceptively misdescriptive.”
These marks are, however, even more difficult to prevent from being registered because a
deceptively misdescriptive mark can be registered (and protected) if it has achieved secondary meaning. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), (f).
216 See e.g., In re Kitaru Innovations Inc., 2013 WL 3090489, at *4.
217 See id. at *3–5.
218 A detailed analysis of the expansion of trademark rights is beyond the scope of this
Article. A few illustrations will suffice. First, the notion of consumer confusion has now
grown to include “‘initial interest’ confusion, ‘source’ or ‘associational’ confusion and
‘post-sale confusion.’” Wolf Appliance, Inc. v. Viking Range Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 878,
889 (W.D. Wis. 2010). As a result, trademark owners’ rights have been enhanced by the
wide variety of claims that may be brought against new market entrants. Other doctrines
have increased the range of phenomena in which trademark rights may now subsist, which
means that today, “almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning.” Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1999); Jane
C. Ginsburg, “See Me, Feel Me, Touch Me, Hea[r] Me” (and Maybe Smell and Taste Me Too): I Am
a Trademark—a US Perspective, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE
92 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008). Trademark rights can, for example, subsist in trade
dress, see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), as well as product
design that has achieved secondary meaning, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
529 U.S. 205 (2000).
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ship.219 Putting this in simple concrete terms, if a firm’s use of an ecolabel
encouraged consumers to “feel good” about selecting a product with
favorable environmental characteristics, such surplus goodwill has no value
under orthodox theory. Yet, outside the trademark reference frame, the
social value of such goodwill to change norms that can mitigate otherwise
intractable environmental problems is obvious. Orthodox trademark theory
has been animated by many scholars’ laudable opposition to widespread
abuses of trademark rights by powerful corporations.220 Nevertheless, a
byproduct of this reactionary stance has been summary dismissal and sometimes the trivialization of normatively valuable trademark functions that lie
outside the signaling function.
Taken together, doctrinal and legislative expansions of trademark rights
extend far beyond the orthodox signaling function.221 Today, trademarks
are the legal foundation for branding strategies that tell stories, instill loyalty,
and arouse passions.222 Marks associated with luxury brands, for example,
are now part of a symbolic economy that offers “peculiarly powerful affirmations of belonging, recognition, and meaning in the midst of the lives of their

A second area of expansion is the set of protections afforded to merchandising goods.
See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F. 3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006);
Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
Rights in merchandising goods sits awkwardly with orthodox trademark theory to the
extent that the object of protection becomes the mark itself, rather than the mark’s ability
to signal a product’s source. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51
UCLA L. REV. 621, 656 (2004); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising
Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 463 (2005); Thomas D. Drescher,
The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687–88 (1999) (observing that trademarks are protected as valuable things in themselves).
Thirdly, the federalization of dilution doctrine has also expanded trademark rights.
See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127. In the dilution context, the trademark expansion narrative is not quite so linear, but the overall trend
has been toward the expansion of rights. See Clarisa Long, The Political Economy of Trademark Dilution, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
132, 144–45 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
219 See Beebe, supra note 218, at 644–45.
220 See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 631 (2004) (“Corporations using trademark law to protect their
corporate image at the expense of the marketplace of ideas and the public domain also
arguably engage in abusive litigation policies, fueled by the expansion of IP law.”).
221 For an early precursor of modern debates, see Schechter, supra note 12. In this
classic article, Schechter argued that the principal function of trademarks is not to designate source, but instead to serve as a vehicle for advertising.
222 JAMES B. TWITCHELL, BRANDED NATION: THE MARKETING OF MEGACHURCH, COLLEGE
INC., AND MUSEUMWORLD 1–46 (2004).
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[consumers].”223 Trademarks have become prominent artifacts of public
culture nationally and, increasingly, internationally.224 Professor Jessica Litman uses the term “[brand] atmospherics” to describe the surplus value of
trademarks associated with a brand’s luster and marketing power.225 Academic critics view such expanded rights as tools for rent seeking: enabling
strategies that transform trademarks from mere signals of source to property
that is valuable in its own right.226 In this light, expanded trademark rights
have few if any redeeming features—they have no effect on consumer search
costs and they pose real threats to competition by increasing barriers to entry
and to free expression insofar as they remove terms and symbols from the
public domain.227
In the face of this dramatic expansion of rights, academic critics have
called for a return to trademark fundamentals, under which the sole objective is preventing free riding by firms with identical or confusingly similar
marks.228 Their key target has been the trademark dilution doctrine.229 The
principal harms that dilution doctrines address are marketplace activities by
other firms that reduce the clarity and potency of a trademark as a signifier
of source.230 Dilution is therefore often described as a kind of “blurring”
that limits a mark’s effectiveness.231 Blurring is another way of describing a
conceptual overlap in the minds of consumers: messages conveyed by marks
are rendered less clear because they must compete for consumers’ attention.232 Many critics claim that the dilution doctrine serves only the interests
of powerful trademark owners.233 As Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has
223 David Tan, The Semiotics of Alpha Brands: Encoding/Decoding/Recoding/Transcoding of
Louis Vuitton and Implications for Trademark Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 225, 228
(2013) (quoting CHRIS ROJEK, CELEBRITY 52 (2001)).
224 See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Cosmopolitanism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 887–88
(2014).
225 Litman, supra note 10, at 1727.
226 See id. at 1733–34.
227 See Lemley, supra note 218, at 1710–13.
228 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 798.
229 See Ilanah Simon Fhima, Dilution by Blurring—A Conceptual Roadmap, 2010 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 44, 44 (describing dilution as “perhaps the most vilified doctrine within contemporary trade mark law”).
230 See Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 473–74 (2008) (providing a brief look at
the rationales for the existence of dilution doctrines).
231 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 425 (2003).
232 See Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 212,
260 (2012) (“[E]vidence of an ‘intent to associate’ alone currently constitutes powerful
evidence of a likelihood of dilution.”). But see Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution
Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 710 (2007)
(“Typically, a blurring claim involves a defendant that applies another merchant’s famous
trademark to products which are so unrelated to those of the trademark owner that consumers are unlikely to be confused about the origin of the goods.”).
233 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 407 (1990).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL206.txt

746

unknown

Seq: 38

notre dame law review

28-DEC-17

10:24

[vol. 93:2

explained, “Outside the signaling context (where trademark rights are protected), increasing the pool of word utilizers does not impose costs on prior
users in the way that, say, adding cattle to a pasture detracts from its ability to
maintain the first farmer’s herd.”234 In short, expanded trademark rights
cannot be justified by fears about a “tragedy of the information commons”
because words are nonrivalrous.235 In addition, critics claim that expanded
trademark protection enables firms to capture the resulting surplus by
increasing the prices for their goods, while competing firms are subject to
higher transaction costs associated with avoiding existing trademarks.236
Either way, the public loses.
Opposition to the expanded scope of the dilution doctrine animates the
deep skepticism among academics and the powerful appeal that orthodox
trademark theory holds as an antidote to these doctrinal and legislative
trends.237 It also exposes the degree to which trademark theory is at odds
with private governance as embodied in ecolabels. The foundation of academic critiques is that trademarks operate in an information commons that
is not congestible.238 This may be true of most conventional trademarks, but
as we have shown, it is manifestly not true of green trademarks.
C.

Trivializing Hybrid Trademark Functions

The potential for trademarks to generate social or individual benefits
that lie outside orthodox theory has been largely rejected by scholars.239
While some scholars, including Professor Dreyfuss, have identified “cases in
the middle,”240 where trademarks appear to perform nonsignaling functions,
the examples either tend to appear trivial or to favor weaker rights. Dreyfuss
illustrates these cases using the example of a t-shirt adorned with the word
“Barbie.”241 This case is hybrid because the mark “Barbie” enhances the
commercial appeal of the shirt, but is used on a product with which it is not
234 Id. at 407.
235 See Lunney, supra note 208, at 463.
236 See Litman, supra note 10, at 1735 (“As the realm of protection expands, it necessarily does so at the expense of competition.”).
237 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187 (2007); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights
and Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW
AND THEORY, supra note 218, at 261; Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational
Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122 (1993).
238 See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533, 536 (2011).
239 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 218, at 484 (“The point of trademark law has never
been to maximize profits for trademark owners at the expense of competitors and
consumers.”).
240 Dreyfuss, supra note 233, at 402.
241 Id. Here “Barbie” is not merely functioning as a component of speech—that is, as a
descriptor of a woman with a certain set of attributes. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Barbie™ , 18 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133 (2015).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL206.txt

unknown

Seq: 39

28-DEC-17

2017] t r a d e m a r k s a n d p r i v a t e e n v i r o n m e n t a l g o v e r n a n c e

10:24

747

commercially associated (i.e., toy dolls marketed by Mattel).242 As Professor
Dreyfuss explains, the expressive elements of a trademark can enhance the
prestige value of an unrelated product or service on which it appears.243
Nevertheless, she and many other scholars dismiss such cases because this
surplus—namely, the ability of the wearer to signal his or her allegiance with
a plastic toy—has little to no social value.244
In other examples, the issues at stake are more substantial, but the equities tend to cut against the trademark owner.245 The most prominent ones
involve trademark rights being asserted to suppress free expression, such as
parodic or political uses of trademarks.246 These constitutionally freighted
uses are then pitched against the naı̈ve, hedonistic consumers of the surplus
value in “Barbie” and the anticompetitive effects of expansive trademark
rights.247 In a classic statement, Professor Jessica Litman makes this view
appear ineluctable:
[I]t would be difficult to argue that the persuasive values embodied in trade
symbols are likely to suffer from underprotection. Indeed, the Mattels, Disneys, and Warner Brothers of the world seem to protect their atmospherics
just fine without legal assistance. Not only can their target audiences tell the
difference between, say, a Barbie doll and some other thirteen-inch fashion
doll, but, regardless of features, they seem well-trained in the art of insisting
on the Mattel product. Nor is the phenomenon limited to the junior set.
The popularity of Ralph Lauren’s Polo brand shirts or Gucci handbags is an
obvious example.248

As we discussed in Part I, however, the information and persuasive values
generated by investments in ecolabels, and the complex environmental standards on which they are based, are not adequately protected under existing
laws. In the market for coffee, for example, competition has led to a proliferation of competing marketplace signals that has overwhelmed consumers
and impeded expression of their preferences.249 With this and other examples in mind, the skepticism expressed in this quotation appears one-sided.
Yet, so long as trademark orthodoxy persists in portraying the functions of
trademarks through a narrow neoliberal economic lens, the countervailing
considerations raised by ecolabels and other forms of private governance will
continue to be neglected and trademarks will continue to serve them poorly.

242 Dreyfuss, supra note 233, at 402.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 402–03; see also Lunney, supra note 208, at 397–98.
245 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 224, at 875; LaFrance, supra note 232, at 713 (arguing
that in light of the First Amendment, dilution laws may not serve a “sufficiently weighty
reason to justify” their existence).
246 Dreyfuss, supra note 233, at 405.
247 See Litman, supra note 10, at 1730–31.
248 Id. at 1729 (footnote omitted).
249 See Chon, supra note 2, at 2341–46.
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The Unacknowledged Normativity of Trademark Theory

Most fundamentally, the evidence that trademarks provide essential
legal support for private environmental governance exposes the parochialism
of orthodox trademark theory. Taken by themselves, the normative commitments of orthodox trademark theory—safeguarding market competition,
preserving free speech, minimizing consumer confusion—have a compelling
logic.250 But trademark theory has the capacity to accommodate other normatively important objectives. Acknowledging this requires scholars to reassess the principle that the only legitimate role for trademarks is signaling the
single anonymous source of products or services.251 It will also unearth the
(often tacit) normative preferences that are immanent in the neutral depiction of markets as depoliticized spaces in which consumer choice is reduced
to purely self-interested preferences. Campaigns of consumer resistance
remind us that, as much as consumers are “sovereign,” they are also citizens252 whose preferences are not limited to the instrumental qualities of
goods or services; ample evidence exists that their preferences extend to
intangible environmental attributes as well. Engaging with the role that
trademarks play in these kinds of noninstrumental preferences requires a
more capacious attitude toward consumer markets than neoliberal economics permits.
Scholars have occasionally questioned the normative assumptions
implicit in trademark theory. Professor Justin Hughes, in particular, has
highlighted the neglect of what he describes as “audience interests” in some
strands of intellectual property scholarship.253 Audience interests include,
for example, expectations consumers may have in the stability of certain “cultural objects.”254 In the trademark context, this includes the brand atmospherics that are the target of many scholarly critiques of expanded rights.255
Professor Hughes argues that trademark scholarship betrays a bias regarding
the relative value of different kinds of expressive activity—parodic uses of
Barbie are valued over identifying uses.256 We take no position either way
other than to observe that orthodox theory should not be given preferential
status uncritically, particularly as trademark law has often served multiple
250 See supra Section II.A.
251 See Beebe, supra note 218, at 669.
252 See generally COHEN, supra note 13, at 41 (describing how boycotts of particular
stores and sit-ins were among the strategies deployed by African Americans in resistance to
Jim Crow laws); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
1770–1823, at 24 (1999) (describing the “popular movement to boycott slave-grown
sugar”).
253 See Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77
TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999).
254 Id. at 961.
255 See Litman, supra note 10, at 1728 (“To say that many consumers seem to attach real
value to atmospherics, however, doesn’t itself demonstrate that those atmospherics should
be afforded legal protection.”).
256 Hughes, supra note 253, at 925–26.
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(sometimes industry-specific) policy ends in the past.257 The diverse origins
and less theoretically pure doctrines reflected in the history of trademark law
provide further grounds for critically evaluating orthodox theory today.
The attraction of orthodox trademark theory may also reflect deeper
jurisprudential commitments in intellectual property law. Under this view,
intellectual property law—and perhaps private law more generally258—is presumed to have an internal logic that is revealed through doctrinal elaboration that “work[s] [itself] pure over time.”259 Through this process, the
legitimacy of legislative or doctrinal measures can be tested by assessing their
consistency with the perceived purposes of the particular area of law.260 In
the context of trademark law, this has meant that academic focus has centered on whether a particular doctrine or legislative reform serves a principle
regarded as foundational (e.g., facilitating competition), and that little attention is given to concerns about whether trademark policy serves other related
ends—such as ensuring that people have access to sustainable agricultural
products261 and can participate in cultural development free from discrimination or, more generally, that policies enhance the human rights and the
dignity of everyone.262
Effective private environmental governance is another normatively desirable end that could also inform debates about the appropriate scope of
trademark rights. The marketplace in which ecolabels operate is not the
abstracted neutral domain over which individual sovereign consumers reign.
In a globalized world where private transactions also reflect a wide range of
values, purchasing decisions reflect more than narrowly instrumental consumer preferences for brand X over brand Y. It is past time for trademark
law and theory to accommodate a broader range of public interests and to
abandon its artificially segmented view of markets and politics.
257 As Sherman and Bently explain, the internationalization of trademark law was an
important catalyst for the development of a “principled” basis for trademark doctrines.
BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760–1911, at 166–72 (1999). For different nations’ trademark
systems to work together, it required the development of uniform principles. Id. at
167–68; see also FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO TRADE-MARKS (1925) (tracing the origins of trademarks to the monopoly over certain
trades enforced by the guild system); Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law:
The Construction of the Legal Concept of Trade Mark (1860–1880), in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS,
supra note 281, at 9.
258 See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (2012).
259 Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023,
1023 (1997).
260 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–10, Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (No.
15-1293) (Justice Breyer asking whether the challenged statute was consistent with trademark policies).
261 See Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual
Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1193 (2002).
262 See generally Graeme W. Austin, Authors’ Human Rights and Copyright Policy, 40
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 405 (2017).
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III. BEYOND TRADEMARK SIGNALING
In this final Part, we briefly explore several options for refining trademark policy to enhance the effectiveness of private governance. The proposed measures address the problems noted above with regressive
competition between certification programs and consumer information overload arising from the need to interpret numerous overlapping ecolabels
when selecting between competing products. We will evaluate three policy
options: (1) categorical prohibitions on conventional trademarks; (2) heightened standards for obtaining both conventional trademarks and certification
marks; and (3) an expanded dilution doctrine for ecolabels, whether covered
by conventional trademarks or certification marks.263
Policies that support private environmental governance shift the focus of
trademark policy away from market competition and a narrow conception of
consumer confusion. Further, unlike the symbolic commons occupied by
conventional trademarks, ecolabels and private governance generally operate
in an information commons that is congestible.264 However, congestion of
this information commons is not simply a barrier to private governance, but
also undermines freedom of expression—when consumers are overwhelmed
by different standards and nomenclatures, communication is effectively foreclosed. An overriding normative consideration of trademark scholars, freedom of expression offers further normative grounding for these policies.265
The reforms to trademark law that we explore have regulatory and doctrinal elements. Although not widespread, clear precedent exists for targeted
regulations that operate in tandem with trademark law; two examples of this
are of particular relevance here. The first program targets trademarks on
pharmaceuticals and illustrates how the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
review processes can be augmented to avoid marketplace confusion. Prior to
registering a trademark for a drug, pharmaceutical companies must obtain
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).266 This quasi-regulatory review process is aimed at preventing confusion among health profes263 In advancing various suggestions directed at enhancing the role of ecolabels to
function better as tools of private governance, we acknowledge the irony that each proposal is regulatory in nature. We express no view as to the normative superiority of private
governance mechanisms over public governance. On the contrary, as the Introduction
underscores, our examination of private governance derives from a pragmatic realism as to
the prospects of meaningful public environmental regulation being advanced. Moreover,
as a number of scholars have convincingly described, private governance mechanisms
operate within a legal ecology of public regulation, hence the emphasis on the interplay
between both public and private governance mechanisms in a number of the analyses. For
a particularly influential analysis of the amalgams of public and private modalities of regulation, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 8–13 (1990).
264 See Litman, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
265 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
266 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 19:149 (setting out the procedures in detail). The
FDA explains the process and purposes of the scheme on its website. See Medication Errors
Related to Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
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sionals about the names of pharmaceuticals and the potentially lifethreatening consequences for patients that could result.267 Accordingly,
FDA review is limited to evaluating the potential for an applicant’s mark to
be confused with currently marketed drugs and other medical products, as
well as commonly used medical abbreviations, medical procedures, and laboratory tests.268 The FDA conducts this review rather than the PTO because it
has the relevant technical expertise and extensive knowledge of medical
errors.
The second example concerns “fasteners,” which are frequently difficult
to mark with a trademark because of the shape or size.269 This is important
because fasteners that fail or are faulty have the potential to result in substantial legal liability from personal injuries or harms to property.270 Under the
Fastener Quality Act,271 special insignia are required on each fastener and
must be separately registered with the PTO to ensure that a fastener’s provenance can be traced back to its supplier.272 The PTO maintains a separate
register for fastener insignia,273 and registration of the insignia is conditional
drugsafety/medicationerrors/default.htm. The FDA uses the following definition for medication errors:
[A]ny preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use
or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice,
health care products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order communication; product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use.
Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PDUFA PILOT PROJECT PROPRIETARY NAME REVIEW:
CONCEPT PAPER 2 (2008), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs /GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidancesdef/UCM072229.pdf (quoting What is a Medication Error?,
NAT’L COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR MEDICATION ERROR REPORTING AND PREVENTION (Sept.
15, 2016), http://www.nccmerp.org/about-medication-errors).
267 See Ty Halasz, Comment, The Game of the Name: Shortcomings in the Dual-Agency Review
of Drug Trademarks and a Remedial Cure, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2012) (citing
statistics).
268 See id. at 237–38. The process is independent of proceedings under the Lanham
Act for likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d
Cir. 2004) (granting preliminary injunction to restrain the use of a mark that had been
approved by the predecessor of the Division of Medication Errors and Technical Support).
Other factors taken into account include “whether the name implies a clinical process not
supported by clinical data, whether the name implies that the drug can do more than it
really does, or whether the name draws too heavily on the generic name that has been
assigned to the drug.” 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 19:149.
269 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 19:151 (noting that the Fastener Quality Act was
enacted to cover small objects such as “screws, nuts, and bolts”).
270 Id.
271 15 U.S.C. § 5401 (2012). The regulations implementing the Fastener Quality Act
are set forth at 15 C.F.R. § 280 (2012). On the workings of this scheme, see 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 19, § 19:151.
272 For the purposes of these regimes, “fasteners” are defined at 15 U.S.C. § 5402(6).
273 See Fastener Insignia Register, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 18, 2017), http:/
/www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/FQA_Registry.pdf.
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on demonstrating compliance with specified safety standards.274 Similar to
the trade-related motivations for establishing ecolabels, this augmented registration scheme was prompted by concerns about the quality and safety of
imported fasteners.275 For our purposes, the details of these schemes are
unimportant; instead, we highlight them because they demonstrate that
trademark law already accommodates policies outside of orthodox theory—
including those associated with highly technical, quasi-regulatory regimes.
A.

Rules and Standards for Reducing Congestion and Information Overload

The two policies we consider for addressing information overload lie at
opposing ends of the rules-versus-standards spectrum. While a judgment will
have to be made in either case about whether conditions in a market sector
warrant limits on registering trademarks, a categorical rule would be (relatively) easier to implement than a standard.276 The simplest rule would prohibit registration of conventional trademarks on ecolabels in a market sector,
perhaps while limiting the number of certification marks that could be registered as well. These policies would give ecolabels more “space”—particularly
cognitive space—to mitigate the consumer information overload that accompanies proliferations of competing ecolabels.277 Under this approach, the
PTO could be empowered to issue rules categorically barring trademarks on
ecolabels in consultation with agencies having relevant expertise, such as the
FTC, the EPA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Energy.
Alternatively, a standards-based approach could be adopted that mirrors
the FDA review process for trademarks on pharmaceuticals. The principal
difference would be that whereas the FDA program centers on confusion
among healthcare workers, ecolabel review would center on consumer confusion. Similar to the FDA program, a federal agency other than the PTO,
perhaps the FTC, would be responsible for evaluating the potential for consumer misunderstanding given the number of ecolabels already in the relevant market sector and would then approve or reject a trademark
(conventional or certification) for submission to the PTO registration process. This process would be more complex than the FDA review given the
greater diversity and, in some cases, size of the potential markets. However,
the basic structure would be merely a variation on the FDA program applied
to different products and markets. This approach would require new legisla274

See Procedures for Implementation of the Fastener Quality Act, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS
TECH. (Dec. 15, 1999), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/
fr991215.htm.
275 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 19:151.
276 See, e.g., Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 559, 564–65 (2010) (“Rules can be more efficient [than standards] both by simplifying and expediting adjudication . . . .”).
277 See, e.g., Horne, supra note 169, at 179 (noting that the information overload surrounding ecolabels effectively confuses consumers).
AND
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tive authority and funding, and would likely require more than one federal
agency to implement.
B.

Adapting Dilution Doctrine to Address Congestion Issues

Despite the controversy that surrounds it, the dilution doctrine is arguably the most promising trademark doctrine for mitigating consumer misunderstanding about ecolabels.278 We believe that this can be a selective
expansion of the dilution doctrine that does not aggravate the corporate
overreaching that has proved so controversial. Nor do we believe that the
dilution doctrine should apply directly to the problems of congestion and
information overload that limit the effectiveness of ecolabels. Instead, we
draw on the dilution doctrine as a source of general principles for addressing
congestion issues. Specifically, rather than limiting the number of trademarks in a market sector, the dilution doctrine could be reformed to reduce
the potential for conceptual overlap between different ecolabels. This strategy could both mitigate consumer information overload and potentially
enhance the salience of branding messages that encourage consumers to
make environmentally responsible purchasing decisions.
The principal target of a reformed dilution doctrine would be a junior
user of a mark who renders a senior mark less potent as a signal of the source
of products or services.279 In this respect, the function of antidilution proscriptions aligns with the conventional signaling function.280 Antidilution
proscriptions go further than this, however, because they target uses of trademarks that will not necessarily generate consumer confusion.281 As a result,
antidilution proscriptions are often used to protect the persuasive elements
and atmospherics of prominent trademarks.282 Congress made this substantially easier by broadening the effective scope of the doctrine283 by overturning caselaw that had adopted a more limited approach.284
In the ecolabel context, the potential blurring implicated by the dilution
doctrine would derive from ecolabels with overlapping standards in a market
sector. This approach would recognize that the persuasive power and communicative content of ecolabels can be diluted when other firms or organiza278 See supra Section II.A.
279 See Fhima, supra note 229, at 80.
280 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, supra note 281, at 65.
281 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (cause of action for dilution exists “regardless of
the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”).
282 See supra Part II.
283 Specifically, by passing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312,
120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). See generally Bone,
supra note 230; Long, supra note 218.
284 The Supreme Court had held in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418
(2003), that a plaintiff in a dilution claim needed to show actual dilution. Under the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, it is necessary to show only a likelihood of dilution. See
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
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tions use marks that convey similar information in the same or a related
product or service sector. The PTO and the courts would be required to give
greater weight to evidence of information overload in markets where ecolabels have proliferated. This could entail, for example, requiring evidence
about the number of ecolabels, their relative salience in the minds of consumers, and the potential for material—but difficult to discern—differences
in the underlying standards and methods to confuse consumers. Use of the
dilution doctrine in this manner would require the PTO and courts to scrutinize more complex questions about consumer responsiveness and comprehension. In other words, the focus would center on the ability of consumers
to discriminate between the often intangible environmental characteristics of
competing products and services. Antiblurring policies in this context would
facilitate reductions in negative environmental externalities without exacerbating rent seeking by powerful trademark owners that has been the focus of
academic opposition to the dilution doctrine.
Doctrinal innovations of this kind require academics and policymakers
to acknowledge that the dilution doctrine should not be limited to preserving a trademark’s capacity to signal the source of a product or service. Other
communicative functions and the public interests they serve should also be
considered. Non-source-designating connotations are, of course, precisely
the kind that are often dismissed as “surplus” and subject to the most withering critiques against a firm’s entitlement to appropriate them.285 Ecolabels
and information-based private governance demonstrate that the information
conveyed in trademarks and brand atmospherics associated with them have
social value that extends far beyond the instrumental self-interests of individual consumers. This should not be read to presume that environmental
interests should outweigh conventional concerns about market competition
and expressive freedoms; rather, we believe that they should be factored into
the mix of normative considerations that inform application of trademark
doctrines.
C.

Procedures for Preventing Races to the Bottom

A final policy proposal addresses regressive competition that can arise
between certification programs that license ecolabels protected under a certification mark. As the discussion of the forestry sector illustrated, competition
between certification programs can create a cycle in which programs try to
attract users by weakening their standards, administrative procedures, or
methods for verifying compliance.286 We found that this cycle is intensified
when one or more of the certification programs in a market sector is controlled by business interests.287 The dynamic should be familiar to environmental lawyers because it mirrors the regulatory competition that is alleged
to occur between states in the federalism literature—only the risks are argua285
286
287

See supra Section II.C.
See supra subsection I.B.2.
See supra subsection I.B.2.
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bly much greater given that institutional checks and balances need not be
present in a certification organization.288
Minimum federal standards are the conventional antidote to regulatory
races to the bottom.289 This may be possible where a related federal regulatory program already exists, but given the costs and complexity of setting
environmental standards, federal intervention is unlikely for most classes of
ecolabels.290 Further, experience with legal protections against deceptive
trademarks suggests that enforcement of such standards would be weak.291
Consistent with recent work by Jeanne Fromer,292 we therefore believe that
procedural rather than substantive policies are the only viable option. They
are also attractive because satisfying specific procedural or auditing requirements could be a condition for registering a certification mark under the
Lanham Act. Examples of procedures that should be considered include
enhanced requirements for transparency, institutional balance and competence (e.g., independent boards, technical expertise), and external auditing
(or third-party accreditation).293 Furthermore, many institutional models
exist in the public and private sectors, particularly as administrative procedures have spread globally and private standard-setting organizations have
become a common feature of many market sectors.294 A virtue of such procedural measures is that they facilitate public scrutiny and understanding of
standards and, through this enhanced accountability, create a brake against
downward competitive pressures.295
We advance these proposals merely to provide a preliminary outline of
the options for amending trademark law to accommodate the broader range
of public interests reflected in private environmental governance. However,
even this brief survey demonstrates that important precedent (the FDA
review of pharmaceutical trademarks) exists within trademark law for the
types of policies we are advocating and that such reforms would place relatively modest demands on the PTO and other supporting federal agencies.
Given the prevailing orthodoxy in trademark law, the greatest obstacle to
these types of reforms is more likely to be ideological than practical or legal.
288 See supra Part II; see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 175, at 1802–03.
289 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 175, at 1803–04.
290 See supra Section I.A.
291 See supra Sections I.A & II.A; see also Fromer, supra note 1, at 173.
292 Fromer, supra note 1, at 173.
293 Key elements of effectual procedural rules include disclosure of the criteria used in
standards, monitoring and testing requirements, and verification measures. Id. at 181.
294 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44,
44–46 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16–17 (2005). See generally
Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
497 (2013).
295 See Fromer, supra note 1, at 181.
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CONCLUSION
Implementing private environmental governance has proved to be more
nuanced and conditional than anticipated when it emerged in the 1990s, but
over the succeeding two decades ecolabels and other forms of private governance have flourished. For a variety of reasons specific to the context and
politics of intellectual property law, trademark law and scholarship have not
kept pace. Instead, intramural battles over the scope of trademark rights—
ignited by overreaching corporate branding strategies—have elevated a reactionary turn in trademark theory that reduces trademarks solely to their signaling function. We have argued that the public interests—specifically
environmental quality and sustainability—impacted by globalized markets
also merit consideration, and that the normative ends of private governance
should factor into, though by no means determine, trademark policy.

